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The spectacular nature of the Teton Dam break emphasizes the
basic problem of Dam Safety in this country. Nevertheless, it took
several dam breaks and near-misses before the Federal Dam Safety Inspection Act was passed in 1972. It took another series of dam breaks
and close-calls for meaningful implementation of the Act to result. Accordingly, this article sets forth a number of critical measures which are
essential to a viable dam safety program. Using this model, the author
evaluates the Federal Dam Inspection Act, the proposed model codes,
and the existing state regulatory procedures and makes appropriate
recommendations.

DAM SAFETY:
THE CRITICAL IMPERATIVE
Denis Binder*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A major reappraisal is being undertaken by the Carter
Administration with respect to Western water policy.1 The
appraisal is not yet completed. So far though, the sanctity of
large federal projects has been tarnished. The benefit-cost
ratio has undergone major attacks.2 Acreage limitations are
highly controversial.3 The need for new multi-purpose federal
dams is questioned.
Copyright D1979 by the University of Wyoming.
*Associate Professor Law, Western New England College. Professor Binder has
served as a consultant on a Native American rights problem to the Seattle District
of the Army Corps of Engneers. In preparing this article he has received substantial input from Corps employees in the Seattle District. The article reflects the views
of Professor Binder and not necessarily those of the Corps or its employees. In addition, the views of the Corps employees with whom Professor Binder consulted are
not necessarily those of the Corps.
Professor Binder will also like to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Ms. Siri
Nelson, then a third year student at the University of Puget Sound, who facilitated
much of the basic research on the article. Finally, a note of appreciation is extended
to Professor Harlan Abrahams, who reviewed a draft of the article.
1. See e.g. Lichtenstein, West's Water FlightIntensifies as CarterPlansProject Cuts,
N. Y. Times, March 7, 1977 at p. 1, col. 3.
2. See e.g. 38 FED. REG. 24778 (1973); U.S. Comm. Gen., Rept to the Cong., Better
Analysis of Uncertainty Needed for Water Resource Projects (PAD 78-67, June 2,

1978);

HOWE,

BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS FOR WATER SYSTEM PLANNING

(1971).

3. See especially, United States v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 559 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1977);
UnitedStates v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1976); United Family Farmers, Inc. v. Kleppe, 552 F.2d 823 (8thCir. 1977); Note, The Sherman Act and
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Although professional engineers have been extensively
involved in dam safety studies for decades, and have issued
invaluable reports and recommendations," including improved construction, safety and inspection criteria, it took a
series of dam disasters, most notably Teton Dam, to bring to
public attention the critical constraint of dam safety. The
spectacular nature of the Teton Dam break, and several
other tragedies, emphasize the basic problem of dam safety,
which is a major, continuing problem in this country. Since
1930 over 100 major dams have failed; yet 1,600 dams are
built every year, subject to licensing provisions ranging
from non-existent to very rigorous. 5 It took several dam
breaks and close-calls for enactment of a Federal Dam Safety
Inspection Act., It took another series of breaks and nearmisses for meaningful implementation of the Act to result. 7
Based upon the limited number of inspections completed so
far, it is difficult to reach conclusions, but the percentage of
dams found to have major safety problems gives cause for
deep concern."
Land: The Interstate Commerce Requirement, 3 COL. J. ENV.
TRELEASE, WATER LAW: RESOURCE USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL

4.
5.

LAW

306 (1977) and

PROTECTION

736, n. 7

(1974).
See especially, U.S. Comm. on Large Dams, (USCOLD); SUPERVISION OF DAMS BY
STATE AUTHORITIES (1966); USCOLD, MODEL LAW FOR STATE SUPERVISION OF SAFETY OF DAMS AND RESERVOIRS; USCOLD, LESSONS FROM DAM INCIDENTS, (1975).
DAM SAFETY: Eighteenth Rep't of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 95th

Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (H.R. 95-880, 1978). Another significant, but misleading statistic,

is that the United States has 35% of the world's dams, but 58% of the major dam
failures. Washington Dep't of Ecology, Washington's Water Resources'Recommendations to the Legislature,January30, 1977. The reason the figure is misleading is
that the United States has reported all dam failures, while other nations have only
selectively reported aU significant incidents to their dams. Comm. on Failure and
Accidents to Large Dams of the United States Comm. on Large Dams, Lessons from
Dam Incidents, USA 77 (1975). A list of major dam failures in the United States between 1930 and 1966 appears in Teton Dam Disaster,Hearings Before a Subcom. of
the House Gov't Op. Comm., 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 59-61 (1976).
6. These include the failure of the Canyon Lake Dam in June, 1972, at Rapid City,
South Dakota and the mine refuse embankment at Buffalo Creek, West Virginia in
February, 1972. The first killed 230 people and the second 125. In addition, in June
1, 1972, Hurricane Agnes caused extensive rainfall and flooding in the Northeast,
and damaged or overtopped a number of dams. There was also the near failure of the
Van Norman Dam during the San Fernando Earthquake in California in February,
1971. The result of these four events was Congressional enactment of P.L. 92-367,
The National Dam Inspection Act of 1972. Comptroller General of the U.S., Rep't to
the Congress, Slow Progress in Developing and Implementing a NationalDam Safety Program5 (CED-77-94, June 24, 1977).
7. Most notable are the Teton Dam Disaster of June 9, 1976 and the failure of the Kelly
Barnes Dam at Toccoa, Georgia, which killed 38 on November 6, 1977. In addition,
an earthen dam gave way in Newfound Creek near Canton, North Carolina on
February 22, 1976, and killed four. Dam Safety Implementation, supra note 6 at 3.
Another earthen dam, the Walter Bouldin Dam, gave way on February 10, 1975.
There were no fatalities. See, Office of Electric Power Regulations Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, Walter Bouldin Dam Failureand Reconstruction (1978).
8. 12 of the first 273 dams checked by the Corps of Engineers in the safety program
were found to need "immediate remedial action to eliminate unsafe conditions." Two
were drained. 2 ENGINEER UPDATE No. 2 at 1 (March 1978). This relatively high
problem rate may be deceptive though in that frequently "suspect" dams have been
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This article will look at the Teton break, the Federal
Dam Inspection Act, proposed model codes, and existing
state regulatory procedures, and then make appropriate recommendations.
On the whole the existing regulatory system is generally
inadequate in light of the enormous risks involved. A need
exists for federal regulation to ensure compliance by the
states with minimum safety standards.
In analyzing dam construction and safety, certain
underlying factors should be kept in mind. First, there are no
problem-free sites, but rather each site possesses different
conditions bearing on dam safety. 9 Thus, flexibility in engineering approaches is mandated by the uniqueness of each
site.
Second, because of unique conditions at each site, it is
impossible to specifically define acceptable design criteria
for all dams. Rather, criteria must be site specific, and
reliance must be placed upon the personnel and expertise of
the agencies, subject to outside review processes.10
Third, a basic criteria for the safe design of earthfill
dams is that seepage flow occurring through or around the
embankment must be controlled so that no internal erosion
will occur."
inspected first.
The need for extensive dam safety investigations is well documented. For example, after the Buffalo Creek coal refuse bank break, coal mine refuse banks and
impoundments were investigated at 495 sites in Ohio, West Virginia, Virgina, Kentucky and Pennsylvania. 30 were classified as critically hazardous, and 172 potentially hazardous, all requiring some corrective action. Office of the Chief of
Engineers, Department of the Army, National Program of Inspection of Dams 3
(1975).
9. Comptroller Gen. of the U.S., Rep 't Actions Needed to Increase the Safety of Dams
Built by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers. 6 (CED-77-85, June
3, 1977). The major federal dam building organizations are the Bureau of Reclamation, which is part of the Interior Department, and the Army Corps of Engineers.
The Bureau operates in the sixteen western states, and is charged with reclauming
land through irrigation. The Corps operates nationwide, and is primarily charged
with flood control and navigation improvement. In fact, the large multi-purpose
dams built by the two agencies are functionally equivalent in that they supply irrigation water, hydroelectric power, recreational opportunities, flood control and
navigation benefits.
10. Id. at 7. Relevant factors include safety, economic feasibility, environmental impact,
local support and suitability in meeting local water resource needs. Id. at 6.
11. Id. at 34. For example, every reservoir has bank storage. Frequently, the bank
storage works its way laterally well into the reservoir banks and around the dam,
and returns to the river downstream. Teton Dam, hearing Bef. the Subcomm. on
Energy Research and Water Resources of the Sen. Comm. on Int. and Ins. Affairs at
37 (Statement of Commissioner Stamm) 194th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1976).
This author is reminded of an anecdote while on a tour of Grand Coulee and
Chief Joseph Dams during the summer of 1976. The Project Manager at Chief
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Finally, and most critical of all, is the premise that socie-

ty will not tolerate a major dam break.' 2 A major dam break,
like a major nuclear disaster, is a risk that society finds
unacceptable. Dam safety is one area where absolute safety
is demanded. 3
The task then is to draw upon the lessons to be learned
from the Teton Break and other dam incidents in constructing a viable dam safety program, and the accompanying
legal norms.
II.

TETON DAM

4
Teton dam was a central-core, zoned earthfill structure,'
rising 305 feet above the river bed, and 405 feet above the
lowest point in the foundation. It was designed and built by
the Bureau of Reclamation. To control seepage, a key trench
was dug in the foundation rock above elevation 5,100 feet,"
Joseph Dam said, "See that leak up there? That's no leak: that's an optical illusion.
The corps does not build dams that crack." He continued along these lines. "In fact,
every dam has leaks and cracks." We design the dam so as to channel the water.
When necessary we will drill to determine the source of the leak and take appropriate measures to correct it, if necessary." Both Chief Joseph and Grand Coulee
are concrete dams.
12. Although this statement is difficult to quantify, the operating premise of the
engineers I know at the Corps is that society will not tolerate a dam break, and
design their structures accordingly. They do not make trade-offs involving risks and
costs, such as we normally do in negligence analysis. See the famous opinion of
Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947).
13. Although this statement may appear hyperbolic, a problem occurs in determining
acceptable risks for dams. For example, the Corps of Engineers uses the "probable
maximum flood for spillover design.' This flood could be exceeded. Therefore, total
safety is impossible; yet society will not tolerate dam breaks because of the costs in
human life, health, property and suffering occasioned thereby. The damages of a
dam break can be great. Aside from the costs of the Teton break, other examples are
available. In settling claims on the Buffalo Creek break, Pittston Corp. so far has
spent $43,880,000, of which $15.1 million was covered by insurance. Wall Street J.,
January 25. 1978 at p. 14, c. 2. The secondary impact of dam failure can also be great.
In effect, a domino effect can result. For example, in order to reduce the reservoir
sufficiently to accept the floodwaters from Teton, the downriver American Falls
Dam had to discharge large amounts of water, flooding out and damaging downriver
canal systems.
14. Various soils and rocks comprised the five different zones of materials in the dam.
The core of the dam, accounting for over half its volume, consisted of a mound of
fine, windblown silt that was compacted to make it impermeable to water. This core
was covered by a blanket of sand, gravel and cobbles. Various other layers of earth
materials and rocks formed additional shells, with somewhat differing configurations being used on the upstream and downstream sides.
The core material was compacted at less than optimum water contact, which
made it very brittle and erodable, which were prime factors in the Teton collapse.
The material, as compacted, permitted continuous erosion channels to be formed in
the core. Independent Panel to Review Cause of Teton Dam Failure, Report to
United States Department of the Interior and State of Idaho on Failure of Teton
Dam 7-14 (1976). Wherever this material would be subjected to the action of flowing
water, it would be attacked and washed away rapidly. Seepage could also produce
backward erosion due to grain-by-grain removal at points of emergence of flow lines,
where such points consisted of voids unprotected by filters. Id. at 12-15.
15. The foundation key trench in each abutment was intended to intercept the more
open rock joints, and to reach a groutable horizon. These trenches were 70' deep.
Crest elevation of the dam was 5332 feet. The dam failed when the water level was at
5301.7 feet, 22.6 feet below the maximum reservoir water level.
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and a cutoff trench below that elevation to foundation rock.

A grout

curtain17

6

was extended below both trenches. Total

storage capacity of the 17 mile long reservoir was 288,250
acre-feet of water.' 8
As a result of the dam break 11 lives were lost, 25,000
people were left homeless, 300 square miles were totally or
partially inundated, and claims approximating $400 million
will be paid by the Bureau of Reclamation.
A. The Lessons to Be Learned
1. Technical
The Teton Dam was breached at 11:57 a.m. on June 9,
1976 as the reservoir was being filled for the first time. Only
5 hours elapsed from the time of the first observed seepage in
the immediate vicinity of the dam until it breached. 'I Extensive post-mortems have disclosed the physical causes of the
breach."0 Essentially, the dam and its foundations were not
structurally sound in light of the difficult geological conditions. Adequate preliminary investigations indicated the
relevant geology and characteristics needed to develop a
16.

17.

18.

19.
20.

The trenches and grout curtains were designed to control seepage. The trenches
were filled with highly impervious and strong material, but which was highly
erodable. Bureau of Reclamation criteria for earth dams provide, whenever
economically feasible, that seepage through a pervious foundation such as Teton, be
cut off by extending a trench to bedrock or other impervious materials, and then filling it with impervious material. Needed Actions, supra note 8, at 29.
Grout is a mixture of bentonite, water and calcium chloride, which, when forced
under high pressure into drill holes or natural openings in rock, is supposed to form
a watertifht seal. The grout curtain consisted of three lines of grout holes on Teton.
U.S. Dep t of the Int., Teton Dam Failure Review Group, Failureof Teton Dam: A
Report of Findings32 (1977). The Bureau of Reclamation normally grouts a foundation along a single line of holes, centered 10 to 20 feet apart to create a grout curtain.
Needed Actions, supra note 9, at 32. The three lines of grout holes at Teton effectively constituted only a single grout curtain since the outer two rows were only intended as semi-pervious grout barriers against which the center row of grout holes could
reasonably be fully and successfully grouted.
The rocks in the canyon walls and bed were highly fractured, providing numerous
passageways 'for water to travel, thereby necessitating the use of design
technologies, such as grouting, to prevent erosion. For a description of the Teton
design, see Boffey, Teton Dam Verdict, A Foul-Up by the Engineers, 195 SCIENCE
270, (1977).
Failure of Teton Dam, supra note 17, at 42.
See Independent Study, supra note 14; Teton Dam, supra note 11, Teton Dam
Failure, Print of the Subcom. on Energy Research and Development of the Sen.
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong. 1st. Sess. 1977); Teton Dam
Claims, Hearings Bef. the Subcom. on Ad. Law & Gov't Rel. of the House Comm. on
the Jud., 94th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1976).
In addition, a separate internal investigation was undertaken to review the
Bureau's procedures and practices on dam safety. Large, Jr., Bureau of Reclamation
Review Team, Report of the Bureau ofReclamation'sDam Safety Review (1977). See
also Needed Actions, supra note 9, Dam Safety, supra note 5, Dam Safety Implementation, supra note 6, and Comm. on the Safety of Dams, Assembly of
ngineering, National Research Council, Safety of Dams: A Review of the Programs
of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation for the Safety of Existing Dams (1977).
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satisfactory design. Thus, sound engineering practices
should have built a structurally safe dam.2
Instead, inadequate measures were taken to prevent internal erosion,22 referred to as "piping". The primary cause
of the leakage was probably either hydraulic fracturing in
the key trench fill,23 or imperfect grouting, or a combination
of these.2 ' The core material used was extremely susceptible
to erosion. A study concluded that the dam failed as a result
of inadequate protection of the impervious core material
from internal erosion.2 5
One key engineering difference in approaches between
the Bureau and the Corps of Engineers is that the Corps
stresses the importance of providing multiple defenses in
dams to prevent erosion or seepage. Grout curtains are used
only in conjunction with other measures to control seepage,
such as filters and sealing of all cracks.2" Corps dams, if
anything, are over-engineered. Indeed, the Corps had just
completed the Ririe Dam 30 miles from the Teton Dam on
roughly similar terrain, but used different methods to safeguard against seepage. Post-Teton studies have indicated no
Teton-type problems at Ririe.27 The Teton investigations emphasized that reliance on a grout curtain as the solution to
21.

Failure of Teton Dam, supra note 16, at 103. Defensive measures, such as rock surface sealing and adequate filters, should have been used. A filter on the downstream
side of thekey trench would have stopped fine material from the infilling from flowing out with the seepage water. A granular fill upstream of the key trench would
have tended to fill cracks that might have occurred across the key trench. Water
would have moved this material into cracks that formed there precluding the opening of passageways through the core material. Teton Dam Failure, supra note 18, at
17.
22. The foundation and adjoining rock had extensive cracks and fissures. One opening
was explored by a Bureau employee for about 100' both downstream and upstream
of the dam's axis. The cavity on the downstream side was about four feet wide. Further exploration was blocked by a large rock, but a room or passage could be seen
beyond. Needed Action, supra note 8, at 26. The extensive grouting program on
Teton Dam was supposed to seal the foundation, but failed to do so. The eroded soil
particles exits through channels in and along the interface of the dam with the
highly pervious abutment rock, and openings existed through inadequately sealed
rock joints, which may have developed through cracks in the core zone in the key
trench. Once started, piping progressed rapidly through the main body of the dam.
Independent Study, supra note 17, at 111.
23. Hydraulic fracturing is a phenomenon, the dynamics of which are not yet fully
understood. Essentially, it is a condition leading to the creation and preparation of a
thin physical separation in a soil whenever the hydraulic pressure exerted on a surface of the soil exceeds the sum of the total normal stress on that surface and the
tensile strength of the soil. It is suspected of occurring in the cores of several embackment dams due to reservoir water pressures. For a detailed analysis of the
hydraulic fracturing theory, see Leed, Appendix D: found at Independent Study,
supra note 17, at D-I to D-39.
24. Id. at 12-18.
26. Failure of Teton Dam, supra note 17, at iii.
26. Needed Action, supra note 9, at 24, 33.
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seepage problems is misplaced since it should never be considered capable of eliminating seepage through the foundation. 8
In the Teton post-mortems, a need was recognized for
much greater use of instrumentation in the dams,2" and the
need for timely interpretation of the data by a single
responsible group. 30 The Bureau had decreased the use of
instrumentation over the past decade because it felt that it
could predict, as a result of past expertise, the structural
behavior of many earth-fill dams as they are subject to reservoir water pressures. 1
On Teton there was not good instrumentation in the
foundations and none in the dam itself. Review of well
readings were made only periodically, and forwarded to the
regional office at least once a month.2 The result was that
the bureau staff was not fully informed of the changing conditions in the embankment and its abutments.
One key factor in a crisis is the capability of rapid lowering of a reservoir through outlet facilities. It was disclosed
during the Teton investigations that not only were Teton's
outlets inoperable, and that there are, as yet, no widely accepted rules for sizing these outlets, but also that many im27.

Id. at 76. For example, Ririe was constructed with multiple layer protective filter
zones against the abutment and impervious core to prevent internal erosion of
material through or around the dam. Teton Dam Disaster, supra note 5, at 508. In
addition, the Corps policy, unlike the Bureau, is to either fill or cover all the cracks in
the rock surface with concrete or grout to render impossible the movement of core
material into cracks in the foundation rock. At Ririe, a three-foot foundation blanket
was placed between the silt core and the foundation rock. All large cracks were
backfilled with concrete, and all small cracks were filled by broomgrouting. Id.
28. Failure of Teton Dam, supra note 17, at 88. The basic function of a grout curtain is
to reduce seepage under a dam to tolerable limits. Seepage will exist, and the embankment must be protected against it.
29. Instrumentation in earthfill dams could include piezometers, observation wells and
surface monuments and other devices to measure earth movement. Instrumentation
in concrete dams usually includes stress meters and strain gauges to measure internal stress, plumblines and collimation systems to monitor deflection of the dam;
deformation meters to measure foundation deformation; drainage collection
systems to monitor seepage; piezometers to measure uplift pressure, and thermometers to measure concrete and reservoir temperatures. Instrumentation though
is no guarantee that dams will not break. For example, the Walter Bouldin Dam
broke on February 10, 1975 without warning in spite of extensive instrumentation.
Office of Electric Power Regulation, Walter Bouldin Dam Failureand Reconstruction 19 (1978).
30. Review Study, supra note 20, at 111. Failure of Teton Dam, supra note 17, at 107.
31. Needed Actions, supra note 9, at 48. The bureau had instrumentation on about half
of its dams. To be precise, instruments have been installed in 37 out of 56 concrete
dam structures, and 147 out of 300 earthen dams, Safety of Dams, supra note 18, at
24.
32. Id at 51. Corps practices, depending on the district, require readings as-often as daily during reservoir filling, and immediate transmission of the data to the proper of:
ficials. Id at 54.
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portant dams have no facilities to permit emptying the reservoir quickly. 3 Here is the seed of future disasters. The sizing
of outlet works should be reviewed to control both the rate of
filling and to provide for emergency reservoir evacuations.
Special precautions should be taken for filling critical
dams in initial filling, first drawing, and refilling stages after
extreme drawdown. The Bureau has a rule of thumb on initial fillings of not allowing the reservoir to fill at a rate exceeding one foot per day."' On Teton, filling commenced in a
time of intensified snowpack runoff. Since the outlet works
were not complete, the reservoir had to be filled at a rate
higher than one foot per day. 5
Other dams have been filled faster, 6 and the rapidity of
the chain of events on Teton suggests insufficient time in
which to have taken advantage of instrumentation warnings. However, a more conservative approach to instrumentation and rate of filling might have averted the disaster. 7
Another inspection-filling lesson comes from Teton. Daily inspections were made of Teton, but not nightly inspections. Dam breaks do not respect the clock, and are as likely
to occur at night as in the day. For example, the Toccoa,
Georgia break that killed 38 occurred at 1:30 a.m.38 Under
the circumstances, nighttime inspection schedules should be
implemented during the critical filling, drawdown, and refilling times.
2. Political-Institutional Lessons
The post-mortem findings on physical defects are
significant for future dam builders. More relevant to this article are the underlying institutional weaknesses discovered
in the dam-building cycle.
33.

Independent Study, supra note 17 at 8-9. Outlets in Corps and Bureau dams could
empty most of the water in 90-120 days. California's dams are generally designed
with outlets that would empty at least half the reservoir in 14 days. Id

34.
35.

Id. at 129.
At one point the reservoir fill rate was up to 4 feet a day. It seems obvious that the
outlet works should be operational prior to initial reservoir filling. Id at 129.
Independent Study, supra note 17, at 10-14.
Id. at 10-15. Needed Actions, supra note 9, at 47.
It occurred on a Sunday, November 6, 1977. Federal Investigative Board, Rep't of
Failure of Kelly Barnes Dam, Toccoa, Georgia 1 (1977). The Alabama Power Company Walter Bouldin Hydroelectric Dam on the Coosa River in Elmore County,
Alabama, failed without warning at 1:30 a.m. on February 10, 1975. It had been in
operation 8 years at the time. 9 FPC No. 37 (August 20, 1976).

36.
37.
38.
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Teton dam was not a mechanical or technical failure, nor
was it an act of God. It was an institutional failure which
ultimately is human failure. Basically, the Bureau of Reclamation, the builder of Teton, had developed a hubris, which
cannot be allowed to recur in an area as critical as dam safety."' An internal Bureau of Reclamation study states that
"past experiences at other dam sites may have given the
USBR designers an unwarranted sense of confidence". 4 0 Ex-

cessive faith was placed on engineering expertise, which is
not fully justified in light of the fact that many areas are still
not fully understood, such as hydraulic fracturing. 1
One of the most significant institutional lessons is that
no identifiable person is responsible for the disaster. In the
bureaucratic maze of the Bureau of Reclamation, it seems
that since everyone was responsible, no one was responsible.42 Teton investigations reveal no records, documents or
reports that show logical resolution of each of the identified
design problems, why a particular design alternative was
considered satisfactory and selected in preference to others,
or why an identified design problem was subsequently
judged important or not important, and omitted from, or excluded from further consideration. The result is that it is now
difficult to determine the personnel involved in a particular
design issue.43
In addition, continuity of personnel from the planning
process through construction is essential so that critical personnel have adequate familiarity with a project. The past
39. Needed Actions, supra note 9, at 12.
40. Failure of Teton Dam, supra note 17, at D-18.
41. Teton Dam Failure, supra note 20 at 26-27.
42. Needed Actions, supra note 9 at 46. An interesting outcome of the Teton break illustrates the lack of responsibility present in the Bureau. When Cecil Andrus
became Secretary of the Interior, he announced that he would fire all Bureau officials responsible for the Teton Break. Denver Post, May 10, 1977 at 23, col. 3.
Harold G. Arthur., Director of Design and Construction for the Bureau, disclaimed
responsibility since the design was engineered by his predecessor, Bernard P.
Beilport, who retired in 1972. Arthur, though, was Bellport's deputy, and prior to
that he was Bellport's "chief design engineer". Bellport denies all responsibility
because he was an administrator, not a design engineer. All the the design eninrs
had retired by the time of the Teton Break, with the exception of Athur. Denver
Post, May 23, 1977 at 13, cols. 1-2.
43. Failure of Teton Dam, supra note 17, at 87. Failure of communications were also
disclosed in the investigations. For example, the principal Bureau designer of Teton
Dam stated he had intended all open cracks in the foundation rock under the highly
erodable core be sealed. This intent was not fully carried out because of unclear instruction drawings, and specifications and nsinterpretations by project staff.
Needed Actions, supra note 9, at 42.
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had seen rapid turnover in individual jobs, with the assumption that the work of one's predecessors was correct."
An internal study of the Bureau's dam safety procedures recommended identification of one agency as the
responsible agency for safety within the Bureau.4 5 Design
and construction functions should be integrally linked in the
agency. Requisite administrative support should be provited the professional staff. Individual responsibility has to be
pinpointed within the agency on all levels;4" signatures are to
reflect technical responsibility.4 7 Interestingly enough, one
reviewing group, comprised of non-lawyers, indicated that
negligence analysis could be a method for determining responsibility.48 The gist of these recommendations was to
eliminate the existing paper-shuffling and passing-on tendencies of the agency.
Strong internal review procedures were advocated.4 9
Reviewers should be independent.5 0 External review should
occur for all dams which could pose a continuous, potential
hazard if failure occurred, as well as of procedures, technologies and special problems requiring innovative solutions.
Unlike the Corps of Engineers, The Tennessee Valley
Authority and the State of California, the Bureau made little
use of outside consultants, and when it did, it was generally
44.

In 1970 16 dam designers produced three dam specifications per year. By 1977 this
same number were producing 6 dam specifications per year. The study revealed
severe understaffing problems. Id. at 64-4. Between 1967 and 1977 funding increased 130% to $326,010,000 while personnel decreased 22% to 8, 458 from 10,850.
Ad at 70. In the interim, many additional responsibilities, such as NEPA and the
Freedom of Information Act have been imposed on the agency. Id. at 63.
There is reason to believe that, because of heavy workloads, supervisors might
find it difficult to spend as much time on reviews as they would otherwise. Teton
Dam Failure, supra note 20, at 38.
45. Review Study, supra note 20 at 11. No single organizational unit in the Bureau was
responsible for dam safety; Safety of Dams, supra note 18, at 21. A related organizational problem is that the en eer-in-charge of construction at any given project
had two masters. He takes techical direction from the Director of Design and Construction, and administrative direction from the Regional Director. The result is a
lack of clear understanding of responsibility. Review Study, supra note 20, at 30.
46. Id. at 11, 46. Because of an organizational reshuffle, a void developed in Bureau
responsibility, Id. at 35-36.
47. Id. at 12, 47. For example, the individual signing the drawing may have had little or
no technical competenc* in that area. Or the approval signature may be by the head
of an organizational entity who has had minimal involvement in the details of the
design. Id. at 47. Commissioner Stamm of the Bureau of Reclamation testified to the
existence in the Bureau of a proclivity for people to initial without reading. Teton
Dam Failure, supra note 18, at 28.
48. Review Study, supra note 20, at 47. If only Torts were so simple!
49. For example, both the accuracy of the technical work and the validity of the basic
assumptions used in performing the work need to be checked before it leaves the
responsible designs unit. Id. at 54. Internal review is recommended at each transition in the dam plan-design-construct-operate process. Id. at 58.
50. Id
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limited to input on a specific problem. It is now recommended that an independent review board be convened for each
major dam project to review both design and construction at
frequent intervals."
A major institutional problem had been reluctance of
the Bureau to discuss problems-not only externally, but
also internally. For example, the Bureau had a near failure at
Fontenelle Dam in Wyoming in 1965. A paper on it was
presented in Turkey in 1967. Copies were circulated in
February 1977, after the collapse of Teton. Many Bureau
engineers in the dam design-construction-operation process
were unaware of the details until after the Teton Dam
failure. 2 Due to the great similarities between the two dams,
the Teton Break may have been prevented. The lessons that
should have been learned from Fontenelle were institutionally forgotten.
On a political-institutional level, one report made specific recommendations to safeguard against the momentum to
continue a project once it has been approved. These proposals consist of the establishment of an office of Dam Safety,53 the expertise and supervision of the dam teams, and internal review procedures. 4 Ultimately though, any solution
to this problem depends upon the quality of the leadership
and the political realities of Washington. President Carter's
attempts to cut back on certain pork barrel, water-development projects in the West illustrate the complexities of this
problem.
It should be noted that the Bureau has abandoned or
modified several projects because of foundation safety problems.55 Neither the Bureau nor the Corps, though, could iden51.

Failure of Teton Dam, supra note 17, at 107. Safety of Dams, supra note 20, at 19.
Needed Actions, supra note 9, at 24, 54. External review is especially critical. Many
of the remaining dam sites are considered more difficult to build on than past sites.
Id. at 6.

52.
53.
54.
55.

Review Study, supra note 20, at 88. One major recommendation of the Fontennelle
paper was that a slow, controlled filling of reservoirs was needed where unfavorable
oundation conditions are known to exist. Needed Actions, supra note 9, at 61.
It was felt that an internal review process could avoid the "momentum to build"
tendency. Review Study, supra note 20, at 53.
Dam Safety Review, supra note 20, at 133.
These include reducing the storage capacity of American Falls Dam and Reservoir
in Idaho by half, abandonment of the Virgin City Dam in Utah, Cannonball Dam in
North Dakota and Bixby Dam in South Dakota before construction commenced.
Teton Dam Disaster, supra note 6, at 274-275.
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tify any dam project terminated once actual construction
had commenced. 6
In hindsight, so many of the recommendations and
lessons learned from Teton smack of common sense and ordinary reasonableness. Yet the fact remains that a disaster
was needed to recognize them.
The Bureau seems to be learning its lessons. 7 Nor
should the Bureau necessarily be singled out for human errors. 8 Teton gave us both an "X-ray analysis" of one particular dam failure and the opportunity to review in detail
the overall area of dam safety. Failure of other dams have
not necessarily received such microscopic analysis.5 9
On a much broader level, a difficult dilemma arises. Acceptance of the prime principle that dams should not break
could slow technology development. Unlike the premises of
the air and water pollution statutes, dam safety cannot be a
Id at 276, 456, 506. A Corps spokesman, in explaining why they could not identify
any dams where construction stopped and the project was abandoned, stated: "I
think the reason why we could not find any is that there is a general principle of
modern engineering that almost any site can be used for construction if the owner
can stand the price." Id. at 506. In other words, the Corps will request additional
money from Congress to correct any foundation problems discovered during construction.
57. For example, in addition to the internal studies undertaken, the Bureau has hired
outside consultants for an independent review of its designs for all storage dams,
and has asked for bids from consulting firms to study its technical procedures used
in planning, designing, and constructing dams to see if they follow reasonable safety
standards within the limits of existing technology. Needed Actions, supra note 9, at
24.
One year after the Teton Break, the Bureau halted filling of the Nambe Falls
Dam in New Mexico, because of grave concern over safety. Observations of six
springs indicate that seepage from the reservoir is finding its way through or
around the right abutment grout curtain at the dam. After Teton the Bureau hired a
9rivate consultant to make an emergency investigation of its seven newest dams.
enver Post, June 6, 1977 at 1, col. 1. As a result of these studies, the Bureau
suspended the pool filling of three of these dams pending further study and remedial
work. Safety of Dams, supra note 20, at 65.
58. For example, a Federal Power Commission investigation into the failure of the
Alabama Power Company Walter Bouldin Dam on February 10, 1975, identified
four major weaknesses, which contributed to the failure: (1) construction of the dam
did not comply with design specifications; (2) company inspection procedures were
inadequate to detect critical deficiencies in construction; (3) FPC staff review procedures were insufficient to identify marginal design criteria before construction
began and (4) FPC staff methods for review of dam construction procedures and
maintenance was not sufficiently exacting to uncover construction deficiencies.
Walter Bouldin Dam, supra note 6, at 22-23.
After studying ad nauseum the record of the Storm King Mountain (Scenic
Hudson) litigation some of us are concerned with the ability of the FPC (now Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission) to give full weight to safety issues. See especially
the discussion of the New York City aquaduct issue in Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. F.P.C., 453 F.2d 465 (2nd Cir. 1971) (Dissent).
59. Compared with the extensive studies on the Teton Break, we have a 20 page report
on the Kelly Barnes Dam disaster, which killed 39 at Toccoa, Georgia. See Federal
56.

Investigative Board, Rep't of Failureof Kelly Barnes Dam, Toccoa, Georgia (1977).
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technology-forcing situation.60 "Engineering, particularly in
the case of dams, is not an experimental science". 6 1 The risk
of loss is too great. Thus, there is strong incentive to conservatively design well within the state-of-the-art since novel
approaches could cause disaster. 62 For example, the key
trench design on Teton was unique; it departed significantly
from past Bureau practices in that it was deeper than usual,
but also narrower for cost reasons.6"
Yet we should not freeze technology. Quite the contrary.
We should be encouraging innovation. Considering the
engineering bias in dam construction to "go by the book",
the Corps approach is probably the best practical solution to
the problem. Innovative solutions to problems are not proscribed, but are subject to review by a panel of outside consultants. 4 Government should also fund independent research in dam construction and safety, and broaden the existing technology sharing activities with other countries,
who have substantial experience in dam construction. To a
major extent, technology sharing is being done through the
International Committee on Large Dams and the State Department technological exchange programs. These activities
should be intensified, and the information received expeditiously disseminated.
III.

CRITICAL PROVISIONS NECESSARY FOR

VIABLE DAM SAFETY AND INSPECTION REGULATION

In developing the parameters of proposed dam safety
legislation, we will draw heavily upon the lessons learned
from Teton, other studies, general observations, common
sense, state statutes, and from several concepts this author
developed in an article on strip-mining. 5 Although the sub60.

See Bleicher, Economic and Technical Feasibility in Clean Air Act Enforcement
Against Stationary Source, 88 HARV. L. REv. 316 (1975), Kramer, Economics,
Technology, and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: The First Six Years, 6
ECOLOGY L. Q. 161 (1976), Note, Technology Forcing Under the Clean Air Act: The
Electric Utility Dilemma, 38 U. Pirr L. XFv. 565 (1977.
61. Teton Dam Failures, supra note 18, at 31. Thus it can be said "earth fill dam design
criteria must be reasonably conservative". Walter Bouldin Dam, supra note 6, at 25.
62. It should be noted that every embankment "can be said to have its own personality
requiring individual design consideration and construction treatment". Treatment
of these individualities produces most of the continuing advances in dam design and
construction technology. Independent Study, supra note 14, at vii-viii.
63. Id. at 25.
64. Id. at 31.
65.

See Binder, Strip Mining, The West and the Nation, 12 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1,

22-25 (1977).
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jects of strip-mining and dam safety may initially appear
unrelated, the underlying issue in both instances, as in most
socio-ecological concerns, is resource allocation. In both instances the goal is to maximize the general welfare while
minimizing the adverse consequences. The regulatory measures essential to advance these goals are very similar. Consequently, many socio-ecological concerns may be resolved
in an interdisciplinary, technology-transfer approach.
The program should include all dams that could pose a
potential hazard to human life or property. Any meaningful
dam safety program should include a permit system administered by a competent state agency. Because of the magnitude of the risks involved with major dams, a bifurcated permit system should be adopted similar to that used in licensing nuclear power plants. An initial permit is needed to begin
construction.6 Then a separate permit, or operating license,
is required before operation (or filling) may commence.
Separate studies, investigations and hearings must be held
before the second license shall issue. The permit system
should cover not only the initial construction of a project but
also any changes or alterations which might affect the integrity and safety of the structure. Similarly, provisions
should be established to govern the removal of existing
structures.', Permits should also be required for significant
changes or modifications to a facility, either during or after
construction.
The permit application must include not only the
schematic of the dam and its immediate physical surroundings, but more importantly, detailed baseline studies of the
dam site and drainage basin, detailing geologic, topographic,
hydrologic and seismic characteristics. These studies must
include establishment of specified ecological and geophysical
baselines, such as ground water characteristics, 9 surface
water flow patterns, meteriological characteristics, flow patterns and history, test borings and plans to minimize
66.
67.
68.

42 U.S.C. § 2235 (1970).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2131, 2133 (1975).
For a broader discussion of the problem of old dams and their removal, see Waite,

Nineteenth Century Dams and Twentieth Century Problems: Commentary on a
Statutory Solution, 28 ME. L. REv. 619 (1977).

69.

Dam design should include a complete analysis of ground water behavior. Review
Study, supra note 20, at 40.
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seepage flow through a dam. Emphasis should be placed on
structural integrity, including construction methods, core
materials, grouting, filters and channels. On a macro level,
dam safety should include a complete analysis of groundwater behavior. Independent experts and boards of outside
consultants should be employed in the dam design, dam
review and safety investigation processes. At a minimum
they should be employed when novel design approaches or
major safety issues arise, and to assess the proposed
measures undertaken to ensure structural integrity.
Plans should provide for adequate instrumentation and
monitoring. Provisions should be included for preconstruction site inspections, inspections during construction, inspections before issuance of the operating license, and
periodic inspections once operation commences. These inspections should occur at intervals of no more than five
years. It may be that subsequent experience will tell us that
inspections and state approval must occur before each distinct phase of construction ensues. This type of inspection
approval provision is becoming common in lesser construction projects and home repairs. Inspection criteria must be
provided so that inspectors, owners and operators are aware
of critical safety constraints. Inspectors must be fully
trained and inspection records should be detailed, comprehensive and consistent in form. Slides, springs, foundation
problems and similar occurrences should be thoroughly investigated to ascertain if structural problems exist in a
dam."0 Rights of access must be provided the inspectors. A
critical constraint is the need for the owner to maintain detailed, up-to-date records of the dam, its history and safety
factors."
To ensure that these responsibilities imposed upon an
agency can be fulfilled, adequate staff and funds must be
provided the agency." Inspection and safety criteria should
70.
71.

72.

Walter Bouldin Dam, supra note 6, at 26-8.
A major handicap in ascertaining the cause of the Kelly Barnes Dam break at Toccoa, Georgia, was the age of the dam, the lack of design, construction and
maintenance records. Federal Investigative Board, Rep 't of Failureof KeUy Barnes
Dam, Toccoa, Georgia 2 (1977).
Adequate funding and staffing is one of the requirements for federal approval of a
state strip mine program. At present, 54,195 dams are under state supervision, but
only $4,371,379 is the determinable approximate annual budget of the state
authorities directly related to dam and, reservoir supervision. Many states have in-.
adequate staff to enforce their dam s ifety statutes. Dam Safety Program, supra
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be regularly upgraded in light of changing technology. In addition to funding through general funds of the state, the expense could also be offset through permit applicant fees, and
charging the dam owner for the reasonable costs of the safety inspections. This provision could occur by requiring the
owner of a dam to be re-licensed at periodic intervals, such as
five years.7 3 The permit application fee would cover the
reasonable costs of inspection. A major factor in any effective inspection program will be the cost. For example, the
Corps estimated that the estimated annual program for the
79,000 dams identified in the inventory will be $73,500,000.1'
Two-thirds of the states have stated they would like to have
federal monies to carry out a meaningful program of dam
safety.
Periodic inspections are essential,75 but are meaningless
without the power to compel corrective actions by the owner.
The statutes should provide for a full range of remedial
powers in the administrating agency, including detailed
emergency powers, which should include, if necessary in
light of the surrounding circumstances, agency assumption
of control over the dam, lowering of the water level, and
power to breach the dam.
Although many of the desired powers of the agency may
already be conferred in broad administrative procedure
acts,7" or the general authority of an agency, or otherwise be
implicit in the broad discretion granted administrative agencies today, still it is advisable to expressly grant these
note 8, at 4-5. See also, Dam Safety, supra, note 4 at 16-17. Tennessee's program

went from $60,000 in funding in 1973 to 0 in 1977. Id. at 19. The history of dam safety legislation in North Carolina is illustrative of state efforts to regulate dam safety
in this country. In 1967 a dam safety act was passed. In 1974 the first money was
appropriated to enforce it. Between 1974 and 1976 300 dams were inspected. In

February 1976, Bear Wallow Dam burst. Then a crash inspection effort was implemented. 22 inspectors were hired, and 3,082 dams identified. The costs of repairs
or removals, borne by the owner, equalled $2 million. Id. at 18-19.

73. See e.g. TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-2514.
74. Dam Safety Program, supra note 8, at 14. This fige averages out to $1,500 per
dam per year. The estimated cost of inspection for significant and high hazard
potential dams is expected to range between $5,000 and $10,000 per dam, depending
on the dam's size and complexity.
75. As a result of the Buffalo Creek Disaster 687 coal waste structures were inspected,
and 230 were determined to be critically or potentially dangerous. The Corps of
Engineers has discovered that periodic inspections not only avert possible structural failure, but also allow construction of less costly remedial measures than if its
structure deteriorated further. This type of inspection program can be analogized to
the benefits of a preventative maintenance program.
76. See e.g. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS' REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT

§ 2 (1970).
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powers in dam safety legislation because of the "strict construction" nature of the agencies involved, such as the Army
Corps of Engineers, which as part of a military body, is conditioned to act within the limited powers expressly conferred
by Congress. The courts should interpret the agency's
powers, especially those relating directly to dam safety,
broadly to carry out the broad public policy in these cases.
Similarly, provisions should be included which would allow
the agency to impose tighter restrictions than the national
minimum standards.77 This directive recognizes the primary
responsibility of the state and affords flexibility in light of
local conditions.
Although the legal system should not encourage
frivolous complaints by outsiders, one lesson of Teton, and
other dam breaks, is not to rely entirely upon the owner or
agency. The history of administrative/environmental litigation over the past fifteen years, indicates the need for meaningful citizen's input.78 Provisions which prevent or financially handicap citizen's involvement may well discourage
the one complaint which is timely and well-founded. In an
area as critical as dam safety, society cannot afford that
risk. One common provision which could well discourage
citizen's input on a dam safety issue requires the citizen's
complainant to advance the costs of a safety investigation
initiated pursuant to his complaint. If his complaint is wellfounded upon investigation, then his money is refunded. 9
An analagous situation under common law requires
posting of a bond by the plaintiff if a preliminary injunction
issued. The purpose was to compensate the defendant for
any losses incurred if, upon full trial, it developed the
preliminary injunction was improvidentially granted." The
federal courts have relaxed this doctrine in environmental
cases brought by public interest groups. "1 The goal is to en77.
78.

See e.g. 30 U.S.C. § 1255 of the Federal Surface Minin* and Reclamation Act.
The growth in citizen-initiated private environmental litigation has created a virtual
revolution in Administrative Law such that distinguished jurists are now publicly
articulating and reappraisingtheir roles. See e.g. Fakes, The Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 498 (1977), Oakes, EnvironmentalLitigation:
CurrentDevelopments and Suggestions for the Future, 15 CONN. L. REV. 531 (1973),
Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of JudicialReview, 59

79.
80.
81.

See notes 142-145, infra, and accompanying text.
See e.g. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
See e.g. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co. 441 F.2d
232 (4th Cir. 1971), Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 473 F.2d 280
(4th Cir. 1972).

CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1974).
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courage these suits where the public interest is being vindicated by public interest groups, frequently opposed by the
public agency which is statutorily charged with protecting
the public interest.
On a broader level, the whole area of environmental litigation has caused individual judges and courts to reassess
their role. 2 Traditional concepts, such as ripeness and83 the
burden of proof, 4 have received sweeping reappraisals
amounting, at times, to a revolution in administrative law. It
would be particularly unfortunate if, in an area as critical to
public health and welfare as dam safety, citizen involvement
should be discouraged. 5 Again the lessons of Teton should
be heeded.
It should also be noted that since the lead time on a
large dam project is great anyway, 86 the additional regulatory lag occasioned by meaningful citizens' involvement,
which may already be required by other statutes, should not
be viewed as critical. Public participation should therefore
occur during the permit application stage and subsequently,
when safety issues arise. To the extent that this participation could delay a project, it should be noted that such
delays are already occasioned through use of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
Procedures should be provided for appealing an agency
decision, both in the permit issuance proceedings, and in the
reinspection process, but appellate processes should not be
allowed to interfere in emergency situations where prompt
action is required.
Other safety provisions should include minimum dam
and reservoir operation standards and criteria, including
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See note 78, supra.
See e.g. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
See especially, Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C.
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied 426 U.S. 941 (1976) and United States v. Reserve Mining
Co., 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
Although NEPA theoretically serves to promote citizen participation, the NEPA
process applies prior to the federal action. It has no effect on existing dams for
which we want public input, such as thorough reports of safety defects.
For example, the Clarence Cannon Dam and Reservoir in Missouri was authorized
by Congress in 1962, initially scheduled for completion in 1973. but is now scheduled
for completion in 1981, eight years late. Thirteen other major Corps of Engineers
dam projects remain uncompleted 11 years after the detailed construction estimate
was completed. There is a schedule slippage of 9 years for the Harry S. Truman Dam
and Reservoir Project. Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Con-

gress, Clarence Cannon Dam and Reservoir - Cost, Schedule, and Safety Problems
8-9 (PSAD-77-131. July 18, 1977).
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river discharge controls, and minimum construction design
standards, always considering though that each dam's
design must be site specific. Plans, criteria and safety
measures should be periodically reviewed to upgrade them in
light of changing technology and knowledge. Safe standards
of 40 years ago may be grossly inadequate today.87 Records
and logs should be maintained and readily available for all
dams. Teton taught us the need for adequate stream warning systems and emergency evacuation plans.88
Dam safety incidents around the country should be
studied, and the results promptly circulated to all concerned
agencies, engineers and others. A central clearing house of
information should be established. At present, only the voluntary, professional organization, the United States Committee on Large Dams, serves a clearing house role.
Special provisions should govern old unused dams.89
Hazards can be especially acute with the older dams, built
50-100 years ago. A few states provide that abandoned dams
will become the property of the state, and then dealt with appropriately.90 One method of maintaining an up-to-date record of dams and their owners would be to require annual
registration similar to municipal licensing requirements, at
the minimum fee. Failure to register for a prescribed period
of years would create a rebuttable presumption of abandonment.
A major problem will be the financing of repairs and
maintenance. Even for the federal government, funds are
limited. For example, the Bureau of Reclamation lists 44
dams that will not pass maximum probable floods. Some of
these are in serious shape, but needed funds for repairs and
up-grading have not been sought. Indeed, the Bureau's last
87.
88.
89.

Compare Davison v. Snohomish County, 149 Wash. 109, 270 P.422 (1928); Bartlett
v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 74 Wash. 2d 881, 447 P.2d 735 11968).
Needed Actions, supra note 9, at 68. See also, Walter Bouldin Dam, supra note 7, at
47.
It has been shown that older dams have experienced failure and accident rates more
frequently and on a larger scale than modern, wellengineered dams constructed
since 1940. Many of the older dams were not designed, or supervised during construction, by engineers. With the development of modern soil dynamics, dam
design, particularly with earth embankments, was drastically revised, and most

dams built by the federal and state governments, major utilities, larger cities, were
well engineered and supervised during construction, Dam Incidents, supra note 4, at
31, 87.

90.

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 58: 373,426;

MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 110.37. Of course, the financial

and legal burdens imposed on the states by these provisions can be great.
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budget requested $5.6 million for repairs, and $723 million
for new construction. 91
On a local level, the problems can be even greater for
those without access to large capital or public resources. For
example, Massachusetts has many old mill dams, which no
longer serve their original purpose. The present owners,
through mesne conveyances, do not have the financial
capabilities, technical knowhow, or incentive to make the
necessary repairs or demolitions.2
One way to increase the chances of a dam being maintained past its uncertain economic life is to require in an appropriate case, where reasonable doubts exist, the creation
and maintenance of a trust fund, the income of which would
go towards maintenance of the dam. 93 Creation of the trust
fund would be a condition to issuance of a permit. Another
method would be a means, such as forfeiture through nonuse, eminent domain, or gift, for the state to acquire an old
dam and then take the necessary remedial actions. The costs
could be paid by a special fund raised through taxes on
operating dams.
Power must be invested in the agency to bar new dams
in areas where safety or environmental values should preclude development, such as in the Wild and Scenic Rivers
system.94
There must exist a willingness in the agency to revoke or
modify existing permits, deny new permits or deny operating permits after completion or construction. 5 In environmental law we witness the hesitancy of courts and
agencies to revoke or deny permits if large amounts of capi91.
92.
93.
94.

95.

Dam Safety, supra note 5, at 24. The Corps requested $1.5 billion for new construction and but $27.5 million for rehabilitation. Id. Examples of deficiences in existing
Bureau dams are discussed in Id. at 22-24.
See Dam Safety Program, supra note 8, at XXXVIII.
See e.g. Daly v. Natural Resources Board, 60 Wis. 2d 208, 208 N.W.2d 839 (1973).
16 U.s.C. §§1271. Under 16 U.S.C. § 1278, neither the Federal Power Commission
nor any other federal agency may license a dam on a river included in the system.
For a general discussion of the Act, see Tarlock & Tippy, The Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act of 1968, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 707 (1970). A few states have similar provisions. See e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-661. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 30.26 and MCH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 281.761. One common provision is to protect fish and wildlife.
See e.g. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1306(1); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 19 § 705.
California has been willing to take these actions. Teton Dam Disaster, supra note 7,
at 325. The reason is undoubtedly because of its past experience with dam breaks.
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tal have been invested in a project, 6 or if the project's
goal corresponds to an essential mission of the agency, such
as the production of power.97 For these reasons, dam safety
should not be entrusted to agencies such as the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission nde Federal Power Commission or state public commissions. Instead, preferably an independent agency should be established whose sole responsibility is dam safety. In the alternative the powers should
be invested in an agency, such as a water resources commission, whose track record evidences a history of carrying out a
multiplicity of responsibilities.
Criteria can be established to promote viable dam safety
mechanisms, including both strong internal review procedures, and external review procedures involving independent consultants, other agencies in an interdisciplinary approach, and public input. However, the key to effective agency action will be internal, and depend upon several factors including the level of funding, the competency of the staff and
the receptiveness to new ideas. Ultimately though, it will depend upon leadership from above. By encouraging input
from outside, such as independent consultants, hopefully a
sufficient catalyst will exist to direct the agency's actions.
IV.

MODEL CODES

The next step in the dam safety study is to compare existing models with the critical provisions, just set forth.
A. United States Committee on Large Dams
The United States Committee on Large Dams98 has proposed a Model Dam Safety Law, which has been enacted by a
few states.9 The Act provides for pre-construction applicaTeton Dam is a good example of this reluctance. The dam was 52% complete at the
time of the Court of Appeals decision.
97. See e.g. the litigation involving the Federal Power Commission and Storm King
Mountain. Scemc Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission,
354 F.2d 608 (2nd Cir. 1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
98. The United States Committee on Large Dams (USCOLD), is a member of the International Commission on Large Dams. It is comprised of professional engineers,
geologists and individuals and organizations concerned with the design, construction, operation and maintenance of dams and reservoirs. The proposed model law
was circulated in 1970, and is found at Dam Safety Program, Appendix C, supra
note 7.
99. See e.g. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 45-701 (1973), IDAHO CODE § 42-170; North Carolina Dam
Safety Law of 1967, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143.215.25; South Carolina Dam and Reservoir Safety Act of 1977, S.C. CODE § 49-11-110; Tennessee Safe Dams Act of 1973,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-2501; West Virginia Dam Control Act of 1973, W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-50-1.
96.
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tions and approval by an agency,"' (including detailed de1 2
sign analysis),'' periodic inspections during construction,
inspections, 03 and review and issuance of a certificate after
construction but before water can be stored." 4 The act
therefore establishes a bifurcated licensing procedure
whereby separate permits are needed for construction and
operation. Completed dams are to be investigated and inspected at least once every five years. 10 5 The agency is empowered to issue corrective measures,0

6

including emer-

7

gency actions.' The act covers all dams, except federal
dams,'08 and the common exception for dams less than
twenty-five inches in height, or with an impounding capacity
of less than 50 acre feet. 109
Several provisions are designed to protect the state's interest, including a non-waiver of sovereign immunity if a
dam breaks." 0 The owner or operator of the dam will remain
legally liable, but the measure of liability is left undefined."'
Thus, resort would be by default to the state common law to
ascertain the standard of care imposed upon the owner or
operator."1 2 The owner remains liable even when the agency
takes over control in an emergency, but by inference," 3
liability in this situation may be limited to negligence.14
Other measures protecting the state interest include
preemption of inconsistent local measures."' In addition, the
100.
101.
102.
103.

104.

MODEL
MODEL
MODEL
MODEL

CODE at § 1160.
CODE at § 1102(f).
CODE at § 1166.
CODE at §§ 1081.2, 1166, 1176.

MODEL CODE at § 1152. In seeking this operating license, the applicant must include
a record of all geological boreholes, grout holes and grouting, a record of permanent

location points, benchmarks and instrumentation, test records of concrete, or other
material used in construction, and a record of seepage flows and embedded instrument readings. MODEL CODE at § 1150.
105.

MODEL CODE at
MODEL CODE at

§

1176.

106.

§ 1178. In determining when an emergency exists, the agency can
consider, interalia, seepage, overtopping, settlement, erosion, cracking, earth movement, earthquakes and failure of facilities, such as bulkheads, flashboards, gates
and conduits. Id. at § 1080.

107.

These include taking control of the dam, lowering the water level, emptying the
reservoir, and other measures as necessary. MODEL CODE at § 1179.
MODEL CODE at § 1005(g).
MODEL CODE at § 1002.

108.
109.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at § 1028.
Id. at §§ 1028-1029.
The question of civil liability of a dam owner for a dam break is so complicated that
it will be the subject of a subsequent article.
1179.
MODEL CODE at
The section states: "The agency's take over will not operate to relieve the owner of a
dam or reservoir of liability for any negligent acts of the owner or his agents. Id. (emphasis added)
MODEL CODE at § 1026.
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state agency can issue appropriate rules and regulations, 1 6
investigate a site,"7 and take necessary legal actions.1 18
The permit application must contain detailed baseline
studies, such as the area of the drainage basins, rainfall,1 1 9
stream-flow, 2 0 flood-flow records, 21 and maps. 22 In addition,
in its discretion, the agency may require topographic,
geographic and seismic studies. 2 ' It can require exploratory
cuts, drills, wells and other pre-permit studies. 1 4 Physical
tests can be made both on-site and in a laboratory. 2 5 All
these studies and plans are in addition to the standard requirements of detailing the dimensions and storage capacity
of the dam, and plans for permanent instrumentation. The
agency on-site inspection before filling shall include a review
of the records, such as geological boreholes, grout holes and
grouting, concrete tests, seepage flows and instrumental
readings. 2 ' The agency shall require the dam owner to maintain up-to-date records of the dam.'2 1
Construction of the dam is to occur under the supervision of a responsible engineer. 2 v Any repairs, other than
routine maintenance, require an application and issuance of
a permit.1 8 In issuing a construction permit, the agency is
empowered to impose terms, conditions and limitations
necessary to safeguard life and property.1 9 The agency has
similar powers in issuing the operating license. 3 '
Pursuant to its inspection powers, the agency can act
upon a written complaint by an individual of an unsafe condition. However, in acting pursuant to such a complaint, the
agency may require the complainant to deposit funds sufficient to cover the costs of inspection. If unsafe conditions
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
126a.
127.
128.
129.
130.

at § 1078.
Its inspection powers include a right of entry. Id. at § 1076.
Id. at § 1083.
Id at § 1102(el.
Id at § 1102(f).
Id at j 1102(h).
Id
Id at § 1103.
Id
Id at § 1103(b).
Id at § 1150.
Id at § 1175.
Id at § 1150.
Id at 4 1027.
Routine maintenance and operation do not include actions affecting the safety of the
structure. Id. at § 1077.
1& at § 1153.
MODEL CODE
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are found to exist, the agency shall order corrective
measures taken, and return the inspection monies to the
complainant. 13 If the complaint is found to be without merit,
the state retains the costs of the inspection. ' 2
The agency can appoint an outside review board to investigate when issues of safety arise.' 3 The costs of the
board will be borne by the dam owner. 134 If an owner objects
to corrective orders or changes, he may request appointment
of an independent consulting board.' 5
Periodic dam investigations can be made by the state's
own engineers, or by others hired by the state. The periodic
addiinvestigations are at the state's expense, but tests or
6
expense.'
owner's
the
at
ordered
be
can
work
tional
The agency is responsible for determining when an
emergency exists.31 ' In an emergency, the agency can order
the owner to perform the requisite repairs, or if necessary,
breach the dam. If the owner fails to do so, the agency can do
3 8 In addition, the agency may
so at the owner's expense."
revoke or suspend any certificate when it determines a dam
or reservoir constitutes a danger to life or property.'3 9
Remedial powers include state assumption of control of the
dam, lowering of the water level, emptying of the reservoir,
protective work, and any other steps necessary under the cir4
cumstances. 1
B. Corps of Engineers Proposed Legislation
The Army Corps of Engineers has submitted to Congress a bill14 ' under which federal agencies would relinquish
jurisdiction over non-federal dams to states with programs
which substantially comply. " 2
131.
132.
133.
134.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
141.
142.

Id. at § 1153.
Id. at §§ 1162-1165.
Id at § 1051.
Id at § 1052.
Id. at § 1167.
Id. at § 1176.
Id. at § 1177.
Id. at §§ 1178 1180.
Id. at § 1154.
The proposed bill is included as an insert at Dam Safety Program, supra note 8.
Id. at § 2(b). The federal agencies affected thereby would be the Corps of Engineers
and Federal Regulatory Commission.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss2/1

24

Binder: Dam Safety: The Critical Imperative

1979

DAM SAFETY

365

In exercising their jurisdiction the federal agencies shall
review the plans and specifications,4 3 perform inspections
during construction,' ' require records to be maintained" 5
and issue a certificate of approval at completion.'46 The Act

covers dams meeting the height and impounding capacities
I47
provided for in the 1972 Federal Dam Inspection Act.
The Secretary of the Army, acting through the Corps of
Engineers, shall have 120 days to issue final recommended
guidelines for safety inspections and investigations of
dams. 148 Other federal agencies should follow the Corps

guidelines.' 4 9 A right of entry to both premises and records is
provided."'
Federal agencies shall periodically inspect the dams
over which they have jurisdiction, at least once every five
years. In doing so, they should evaluate the hydrologic
capabilities, structural stability, and operational adequacy
in assessing the safety of the dam.'
Inspection expenses, remedial measures and other expenses reviewed by the federal agency with respect to nonfederal dams shall be reimbursed by the dam's owner to the
government.'52
Finally, the Act would terminate the requirement of a
federal dam inspection program carried out by the Corps of
Engineers, but would retain the Corps dam inventory
system.153 The Act would not relieve a dam owner or
operator of legal duties, obligations or liabilities. Nor would
it create any liability in the United States caused by action
54
or failure to act.1
C. Critique of the ProposedActs
The United States Committee on Large Dams Model
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id
Id.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at
at
at
at
at
at

3(e)(1).
3(e)(2).
3(e)(3).
3(e)(4).
§ 2.
§ 4.

151.

Id at § 3(b)(1).

152.
153.
154.

Id at § 3(c).
Id at § 8.
Id at § 9.

§
§
§
§
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Code and the Corps of Engineers proposals should be viewed
as complementary parts of a total package, the gist of which
is that the Corps is giving back to the states, through the
model code primary line, responsibility over dam safety.
Several deficiencies exist with respect to the package, starting with the exceptions.
The size constraints used in defining "dam", exclude an
unknown number of structures, which pose a serious risk
potential to human life or property. For example, the Toccoa,
Georgia dam break involved a dam which barely met the
statutory definition of "dam". 55 Similarly, the exceptions
for federally operated or licensed dams should be premised
upon periodic, competent inspections by the appropriate
agency. In fact, the inspection practices of the various agencies fluctuate widely. The Teton Dam, for example, was a
federal dam subject to the Act's exceptions. The agency involved, the Bureau of Reclamation, had a near-tragedy 15
years earlier, and now reports that several of its dams could
15
break, but is not taking significant remedial measures, 6
thereby illustrating the need for mandatory remedial measures.
The express powers granted in the Corps proposals are
very limited, and will require judicial decisions to flesh out
their dimensions. The Corps proposal makes no provision for
public input, either by expert consultants or by concerned
citizens. The Model Code, through the inspection fee deposit
provision, severely restricts meaningful citizen's complaints
on the safety of any existing dam. It does not contain major
instrumentation and monitoring provisions. It fails to cover
old or abandoned dams. It does not provide for operational
stream warning systems or emergency evacuation plans. It
does not provide for periodic review of standards although
it does provide for investigation and reviews of safety advances elsewhere. Nor are there provisions prohibiting dams
in specified areas. Indeed, .it provides little in the way of legislative mandates that the states must meet.
155.

The Bear Wallow Dam Break in North Carolina, which killed four, involved a struc-

156.

ture which did not meet the statutory definition of "dam".
See note 91 supra and accompany text.
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The model code does however contain the bifurcated permit system, detailed baseline studies, rights of inspection
and remedial-emergency powers essential to a viable dam
safety program. It also provides for the use of outside consultants. On the other hand, the Corps proposal creates a
minor regulatory gap whereby regulations are to be issued
by one agency, the Corps of Engineers, but which do not
have to be followed by other agencies. The proposed act fails
to establish minimum national uniform standards which
must be followed in issuing rules and regulations, fails to
establish minimal inspection criteria, or enforcement procedures, as is common with other federal acts providing for a
cooperative federal-state approval.'57 An explanatory statement accompanying the proposed act recognizes the wide
discretion granted the agencies in issuing rules and regulations.
The effect of abolishing the National Dam Inspection
Program is a retrogression in efforts to ensure dam safety
nationally. Existing state measures are generally inadequate, and the proposed act does not mandate meaningful
state efforts. Thus, we would be left with large gaps on a national level. Adoption of the Model Code by states would go
a long way to filling the gap, but serious deficiencies exist
with respect to it.
V.

EXISTING LEGAL INSTITUTIONS GOVERNING DAM SAFETY

At this stage in the dam safety study, it is relevant to
contrast the critical measures essential to viable dam safety
programs, and the models, with the existing, but generally
deficient, legal norms.
A. FederalDam Safety Inspections

1. Federal Dam Safety and Inspections Act
As a result of several dam breaks and near misses in the
early 1970's,18 Congress enacted P.L. 92-367, the Federal
Dam Inspection and Safety Act of 1972,119 which authorizes
157. See e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 1857C-5(a) (Clean Air Act of 1978); 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Federal
Water Pollutions Control Act Amendments of 1972).
158. See notes 4-5, supra and accompanying text.
159. 86 STAT. 606.
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a federal dam inventory and inspection procedure, as well as
safety inspections. The act is relatively short, and contains
numerous deficiencies in its provisions.
Under the Act dams are defined as being 25' or more in
height, or having an impounding capacity of 50 acre-feet or
more.'" Impounding structures which do16 not meet either of
these two tests are not considered dams. '
As soon as possible, the Secretary of the Army, acting
through the Corps of Engineers, is directed to carry out a national program of inspecting dams, as defined, excluding
dams constructed or authorized by specified federal agencies, dams inspected during the preceding 12 months by a
state agency, and dams which the Secretary determines do
not pose a threat to human life or property. 12 The inspection
program commenced in December 1977.
The results of an inspection are to be given to the Governor of the appropriate state. In situations where hazardous
conditions exist, the Governor shall be notified immediately,
and if requested by the Governor, provided advice and recommendations on appropriate remedial measures.161
The Secretary is to report back to Congress on a national dam inventory, the results of the safety inspections,
and recommendations for a comprehensive national dam
safety program.' The inventory report was completed in
1975. Finally, nothing in the act, or actions or inactions
taken pursuant thereon, shall operate to relieve an owner or
operator of any legal duties or liabilities, or create liability in
the United States. t
There are several deficiencies in the federal act, starting
with the exceptions. A substantial deficiency is the height
160.
161.

Id at § 1. The 25 foot limitation is measured from the natural bed of the stream.
Irrespective of this height and storage capacity, a structure is not considered a dam
if it either is 6 foot or less in height, or has a storage capacity of 15 acre feet or less.
Id.
162. The specified federal agencies are the Bureau of Reclamation, Tennessee Valley
Authority and the International Boundary and Water Commission. Also exempt are
dams licensed pursuant to the Federal Power Act. Id at § 2. In determining whether
a dam constitutes a danger to human life or property, factors to be considered are
overtopping, seepage, settlement, erosion, sediment, cracking, earth movement,
earthquakes, failure of bulkheads, flashboard, gates or conduits, or other conditions.
Id at § 4.
163. Id at § 3.
164. Id at § 5.
165. Id at § 6.
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and size limitations on dams covered by the Act. A second
deficiency is the exception for federal dams. The previous
section pointed out the problems with these exceptions.
The Act nowhere mandates remedial action if safety
defects are discovered. All it requires is a report by the Secretary to the appropriate Governor. Presumably, the state or
owner would then carry out the necessary corrective measures. However, a number of states possess either no appro66
priate dam safety legislation, or very ineffective measures.1
In these situations, the state would be forced to utilize the
vagrancies of public nuisance law to compel corrective measures by a recalcitrant owner. 67 An even greater problem exists when the owner is unknown, out of the jurisdiction, or
financially unable to take remedial action.
Another problem is that of access for the safety investigators. Nowhere does the Act provide the Corps of
Engineers the right of access to any dam. Entry might be
possible under the terms of a permit issued pursuant to the
Rivers and Harbors act for structures in navigable waters, 68
or by the Federal Power Commission for Hydro Electric
Dams on Navigable Waters.'6 9 The operating assumption of
Corps officials is that, if necessary, they will depend upon
state law and officials for entry. 7 '
A related problem is that the act does not require either
the production or maintenance of records by dam owners or
operators. Records of construction problems and operating
histories can be of critical importance in resolving suspected
safety questions.
The Act also fails to provide for the cost of maintaining
and reproducing these records, which on a small dam, might
166.
167.

168.

See notes 174-182 infra, and accompanying text.
A condition which creates a dangerous threat to public life is a public nuisance. See
RESTATEMENT TORTS § 821B. Equitable relief, and if necessary, abatement are

available as remedies. The privilege of abatement includes a right of entry, and the
use of reasonable force. See PROSSER. TORTS. 605-606.
For example, under the current permit form, Condition 1 If)authorizes the District
Engineer to make periodic inspections at any time necessary to assure the activity
is being performed in accordance with the terms and conditions of the permit. Under

1 (g), the permittee shall maintain the structure or work in good condition, and in accordance with the attached plans and drawings, Dep't of the Army Permit 2 (Eng.
169.
170.

Form 1721, 1 April 1974) (ER 1145-2-203).
16 U.S.C. § 797(e).
And that may lead us back to the vagaries of public nuisance law since many states
lack a statutory right of entry for dam inspections. See note 167, supra and accompanying text.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1979

29

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 14 [1979], Iss. 2, Art. 1

370

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIV

be highly expensive in proportion to the revenues and
benefits accruing to the operator through running of the
dam. Finally, the Act does not provide for periodic inspections, or reinspections, which would help insure the continuing safety of dams.
2. Implementation of the Statute.
In hindsight, the major defect in the Act is a very common problem with statutes; the provisions were not selfexecuting.' 7 ' Just as it took a series of dam failures to prod
enactment of the measure, so too it took another series to
prod implementation of the inspection provisions. Because
of opposition from the Office of Management and Budget,1 '
the only funds made available to the Corps pursuant to the
Act were for the inventory process, which relied upon the
states for the basic data.
The Corps undertook a limited inventory under which it
tried to identify dams which, if they failed, could harm
human life or property. Yet no actual inspections were made,
and no attempt was made to assess the risk of failure of any
given dam. The Corps identified a total of 49,329 dams, of
which 20,000 or roughly 40% posed a significant risk to
human life or property. Nine thousand of these were described as "high hazard".'7 3 However, less than 8% of these
dams had ever been inspected by federal or state officials.
The Corps estimated the study was 90% accurate. It did
little to verify the information submitted by the state.'74 Instead, it relied upon voluntary participation by the states. It
did not provide minimal inspection criteria to the states.
171.

See note 7, supra.

172.

OMB at one point instructed the Army that no Federal inspections of non-federal
dams were to occur. Dam Safety, supra, note 5,at 7. It was the view of the Nixon
and Ford administrations that dam safety of non-federal dams was a matter of
state, not federal, concern.
Thus, 11,000 were in the "significant hazard potential category". Dam Safety Pro.
gram, supra note 8,at 14. High hazard dams involve a potential downstream loss of
life of more than a few, and "excessive-extensive community, industrial or
agricultural potential economic loss. Significant hazard dams involve a potential
downstream loss of life of a few and appreciable potential downstream economic
loss. Low hazard dams involve no potential downstream economic loss. Low hazard
dams involve no potential downstream loss of life and minimal potential

173.

downstream economic life. The Corps did not try to quantify these definitions,

thereby allowing each state to interpret them differently. Dam Safety Implementation, supra note 6, at 7. One major problem with the inventory is that it excluded

many dams because of the size limitations, but which pose a threat to human life or
174.

property. Id. at 6.
Id at 5.
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Nor, because of a lack of actual inspections, could it identify
problem areas calling for increased federal standards.17
The Corps has recently implemented an actual inspection program, which will be limited to the 9,000 "high
hazard" dams. Although it is too early to form conclusions,
it is significant that of the first 273 dams inspected by the
Corps, 12 were found to need "immediate remedial action to
eliminate unsafe conditions". Two were in such critical shape
that they were drawn down. " 6 A major problem on a number
of dams inspected so far is a lack of drainage facilities.
Another problem that has developed is that on occasion, the
inspector cannot determine who the owner is, much less
what steps should be taken if there is no owner. "'
One caveat on these inspections is that the safety
reports generally do not provide that the dams are "safe",
but report on deficiencies. If no deficiencies are found, then
the report will provide, in a manner similar to the auditor's
statement in an annual report, something like "no deficiency
is found based on established criteria".7 8 The Corps is not
trying to be, and cannot be, an insurer of safety in its inspections.
B. State Dam Safety and Inspection Program
1. General
The purpose of this section is to detail the existing state
regulatory systems. Individual state provisions will be highlighted where they differ from the general state provisions.
Many significant requirements though are not imposed by
statute, but through regulations, internal policies or discretion. These practices will be mentioned where appropriate.
The fact that many essential provisions are uncodified illustrates a grave weakness in the statutory scheme.
The record of state dam safety legislation is sporadic
from state to state. The overall effect is one of severe deficiencies on a national level. Eleven states or territories have
no laws regarding any aspect of dam safety. Six states have
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 13-14.
See note 8, supr.
These statements are based upon discussions with Corps personnel in the Seattle
District of the Corps.
Id

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1979

31

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 14 [1979], Iss. 2, Art. 1

372

Vol. XIV

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

CRITICAL PROVISIONS NECESSARY
FOR VIABLE DAM SAFETY
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no dam safety statutes.'79 Twenty states have old mill dam
acts, which are generally inadequate in light of today's
needs. 8" Four states' programs are basically part of their
" ' but in two
regular water permit-appropriation system,18
others, this system specifically includes dam safety provisions. 182 Only a few states have enacted fairly comprehensive
statutes. 8 3 Twenty-four states told the Corps of Engineers
that current dam safety regulations do not fully meet present needs. 8 " Twenty-nine states present a fairly comprehensive statutory scheme, which may or may not be effective in
practice."'
The general approach is that of a permit system administered by an administrative agency. The agency is
generally the equivalent of a Department of Natural Re179.

Dam Safety Program, supra note 8, at 4. States with no dam safety legislation are
Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii and Missouri. Since the Corps study
was conducted, Florida and South Carolina enacted dam safety measures.

180.

ALA. CODE tit. 18 § 2-1, ARE. STAT. ANN. § 35-501, DEL. CODE, tit. 7 Ch. 23 § 1901
(non-navigable waters), IOWA CODE ANN. § 469, KAN. STAT. § 829, Ky. REV. STAT. §
182.010, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 651, MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 253, MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 46.22, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 110-14, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 482-1, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32 § 291, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 46-18-1, TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-17-1, VA.
CODE ANN. § 62.1-116, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 31.31 (non-navigable waters).
Miss. CODE ANN. § 51-3-1, OK. STAT. ANN. tit. 60 § 60, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. tit.
2 § 6.002, S. DAK. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 46-5-1. This procedure does not necessarily

181.

mean that these measures are totally inadequate. For example, the Texas code requires a permit (TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. tit. 2 § 6.121), the filing of an application
with information and maps (Id at §§ 5-123, 124), inspection provisions during construction (Id. at § 6.064), and a right of entry onto the land (Id. at § 6.065).
182.

183.

184.

185.

N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 75-5-1, OR. REV. STAT. § 537.010.
See e.g. Aeiz, REV. STAT. § 45-701 (1973), CAL. WATER CODE § 6001, IDAHO CODE §
42-170, North Carolina Dam Safety Law of 1967, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143.215.25,

South Carolina Dam and Reservoir Safety Act of 1977, S. C. CODE § 49-11-110, Tennessee Safe Dams Act of 1973, TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-2501, West Virginia Dam Control Act of 1973, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-50-1, and Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-30.
Dam Safety Program, supra note 7, at 24, A-140 to A-143. Alabama, Arkansas,
Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington were unsatisfied with their dam safety program.
In addition to the statute set forth in note 203, supra, see COLO. REV. STAT. §

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1979

35

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 14 [1979], Iss. 2, Art. 1

376

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIV

sources, or water resources board. 18 6 In states where it is
closely tied to the permit-appropriation system, it is admina
istered by the state engineer.'8 7 Occasionally it is run 1by
88
special agency, such as the public utilities commission.
2. Coverage
Only eleven statutes have provisions which cover any
dam which may pose a threat to human life or property, 189
but three of these also look to height or capacity limitations. 19 0 Significantly, most states which define "dam" for
regulatory purposes in terms of height or storage capacity
impose smaller size exemptions 91 than those of the model
codes, which illustrates the deficiencies in these proposed
37-87-100, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-110, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.40, IND. STAT.

ANN. § 13-2-20-1, IOWA CODE ANN. § 455A.17,464.1, MD. ANN. CODE ART. 8 § 802(a),
MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 253, § 44, MICH. Come. LAWS ANN. § 281.131, MINN. STAT.

186.

187.
188.
189.

190.

191.

ANN. § 105.42, MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 89-701, NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-208, NEV. REV.
STAT. § 535.010, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482.3, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 57.4-1, N. MEx.
STAT. ANN. § 75-5-1, N.Y. WATER LAW tit. 5 § 15-0501, (McKinney), N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 61-02-20, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1521.06, OR. REv. STAT. § 537.130, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32 § 682, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 46-19-1, VEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1081.
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03-350, and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 31.02.
The following states regulate dam safety through a water resources board, or water
division of a broader agency or through an equivalent agency: Arkansas, Delaware,
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. States acting through a
Department of Ecology, Department of Natural Resources, or the equivalent include Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina and West Virginia. Arizona, California,
Colorado and New Jersey act through specialized dam safety offices. See Dam Safety Program, supra note 7, at A-23 to A-26.
New Mexico and Wyoming.
Maine acts through the Public Service Commission. Dams producing hydroelectric
power are regulated in Vermont through the Public Service Board. Illinois regulates
dam safety through the Department of Transportation.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-110, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373-403(1), 413, ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 19 § 70, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 153 § 46, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482:3, R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 46-19-3, S.C. CODE § 49-11-120(4), § 49-11-200(2) UTAH CODE ANN. §
73-5-5 (in general, a storage capacity of 20 acre feet or more, unless constitutes a
hazard to life or property, but the act excludes dams not posing a hazard to life or
property), VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-107 and Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-307 (20' in height or 50
acre feet storage capacity are the general requirements for the act's applicability,
but the state can enforce the provisions as necessary).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.25(e) and (1) (15' in height, 10 acre feet of storage
capacity), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 682, 688 (private streams, drainage area of less
than 1/2 square mile, and which cannot imperil life or property), and WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 86-16-020, 86-03-350 (10 acre feet).
Aaiz. REV. STAT. § 45-701 (25' or 50 acre feet), ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1310(1), (b) (20
acre feet or at or below high water mark, CAL. WATER CODE § 6002 (25' or 50 acre
feet), COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-87-105 (10' or 1,000 acre feet, or 20 acre feet of surface
area), IDAHO CODE § 43-1711(b (10' or 50 acre feet), IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-2-20-4 (20',
100 acre feet or drainage area of one-square mile, IOWA CODE ANN. § 455A.25 (5,000)
gallons per day), KAN. STAT. ANN. (10' or 15 acre feet), MD. ANN. CODE ART. 4 §
804(b) (small ponds), MAss. ANN. LAWS Ch. 253 § 44 (10', one million gallons, or
drainage area of one square mile), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 281.131 (5' or 5 acres),
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 000000 (dams outside public waters), MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §
89-702.1 (1), (2) (25' or 50 acre feet), NEB. REV. STAT. 6 46-257(71 (30' or 50 acre feet),
NEV. REV. SWAT. (10 acre feet), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58, 4-1 (5' or '/ square mile
drainage area), N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 57-5-30 (10' or 10 acre feet), N.Y. WATER LAW
Art. 5 § 15-0503(4) (one square mile drainage area, 10' or 1,000,000 Fallons), N.D.
CENT. CODE § 61-02-20 (19'/2 acre feet), OR. REV. STAT. § 540-400 (10 or 3,000,000
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physical standards. Several states have exemptions for certain special classes of small dams, such as livestock or rancha special permit-inspection
ing dams,'92 but Arizona imposes
93
program for livestock dams.

3. Use of Consultants and Information Required in
Applications
Only 16 states authorize the employment of outside consultants for various purposes 94 such as review of proposed
plans, 9 or for on-site inspections.'96 In addition, 11 states require the plans and designs to be done by a registered professional engineer.' Three of these require expertise on his
part.9 8 Five states require the construction to be under the
aegis of a registered professional engineer. 99 These requirements undoubtedly increase the chances of the smaller dams
being constructed in accordance with sound engineering
practices, but probably have no effect on the larger projects,
which will have several engineers involved in the design and
construction.
gallons), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1521.06 (10' or 1,000 acre feet), TENN. CODE ANN. §

70-7502(a) (20' or 30 acre feet), VA. CODE ANN. § 1-104.1 (25' or 100 acre feet), VER.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1082 (500,000 cubic feet of water), W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-50-3(e)
(15' or 10 acre feet). See also Dam Safety Program, supra note 7, at A-43 to A-50.
192. See e.g. N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 75-5-30 (stock dams), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 152-1-06
(conservancy districts), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 691 (fish and fishing purposes if not
over 3' in height), TEx. REV. CiR. STAT. ANN. tit. 2 § 11.142 (domestic and livestock
reservoirs).
193.
194.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-731.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-711, CAL. WATER CODE §§ 6053, 6054, 6056, COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 37-87-186, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-110, 113, MICH. CONG. LAWS ANN. §

281.1326, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 482-6, 8, N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 75-5-8, N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 143-215, 34, OR. REV. STAT. § 540.38, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 46-19-7,
VER. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §§ 1089, 1095(a), VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-100, W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-50-4(g), Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-310.
195.

CAL. WATER CODE §§ 6054, 6056.

196. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-87-106, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-113, N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 482-8, VER. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 1095(a), W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-50-9, Wyo.
197.

STAT. § 41-3-310.
IDAHO CODE § 42-1715, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 281.132, N. MEX. STAT. ANN. §

75-5-8, N.Y. WATER LAW tit. 5 § 15-0503(5), N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-215-29, OHIO

198.

199.

REV. CODE ANN. § 1521.06, S.C. CODE § 49-11-220, TENN. CODE ANN. ch. 182 §
70-2506, VA. CODE ANN. § 621-106(4), W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-50-5, Wyo. STAT. §
41-3-309. In addition, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington require plans and construction to be supervised by a professional engineer.
Dam Safety Program, supra note 7, at A-111 to A-113.
N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 75-5-8 (the qualifications of the registered professional
engineer must be approved by the state engineer), N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
143-215-29 (legally qualified engineer), and WYO. STAT. § 41-3303. North Carolina requires for the certificate of a qualified architect or constructor that he's responsible
for the design of the dam, and that it's safe and adequate.
IDAHO CODE § 42-1715, N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 75-5-8, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
143-215.29, Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-309.
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A major problem arises with respect to the information
required with the application for a permit. A general provision requires the submission of plans, specifications, maps
and any other information required by the agency. 00 Arizona
provides for the submission of information on the drainage
area, rainfall and streamflow records, flood flow records and
subsoil and foundation conditions.20 ' Idaho" 2 and Wisconsin" 3 have extensive requirements, in the discretion of the
agency, for subsoil and foundation conditions and materials,
and extensive preconstruction investigations and reports on
hydrologic, geologic and foundation conditions. North Carolina requests stream flow and rainfall information.2 4 Pennsylvania requires complete maps, plans, profiles and specifications. °5 Virginia requires the "essential facts,"200 and West
Virginia expects the "relevant and necessary" information. 1 1 Oregon enumerates extensive project descriptions.2 8
The effect of detailing these state statutory requirements, which exceed the normal "maps, plans, specifications and other information as requested" is to show how
little is required by statute in the way of detailed baseline
studies, and how much we are dependent upon an administrative agency, which may be understaffed, under-budgeted
or lacking in expertise, for the type of pre-construction
scrutiny and planning that will minimize the risks of a major
dam failure.0 9
200.

ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-1304, 1305, CAL. WATER CODE § 6077, COLO. REV. STAT.
37-87-105, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-112. IDAHO CODE § 42-1712. IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 469.2. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 68-1502, 829-302, MD. ANN. CODE ART. 8 § 805, MASS.
ANN. LAWS Ch. 253 § 4, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.42 (equivalent to NEPA), Miss.
CODE ANN. § 281.132, NEV. REV. STAT. § 535.010, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:4-2, N. MEX.
STAT. ANN. § 75-5-1, N.Y. WATER LAW tit. 5 § 15-0503(5), N. DAR. CENT. CODE §
61-0220, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1521-06, OR. REV. STAT. § 537-130, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 32 § 683, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
46-19-3, S. DAR. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 46-511,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-2506, UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-5-5, VER. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 §
1083, Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-308. Nebraska requires detailed engineering plans. NB.

201.

REV. STAT. § 46-257.
ARiz. REV. STAT. § 45-703(b).

202.
203.
204.
205.

IDAHO CODE § 47-1712.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 31-12.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.26.
VA. CODE § 62.1-85.

207.

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-50-5.

208.
209.

OR. REV. STAT. § 537,140.

In addition to any statutory requirements, the following states require geologic,
soils and hydrologic data: Arizona, Arkansas (hydrologic data). California. Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois (hydrologic only), Indiana, Iowa, Kansas (on major
structures), Kentucky (on Class B and C structures), Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan (if deemed necessary by the Department of Natural Resources, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada (logs of borings or test site), New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming (hydrologic data in special cases). Dam Safety

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss2/1

38

Binder: Dam Safety: The Critical Imperative

1979

DAM SAFETY

379

4. Permit Systems
Furthermore, although 41 states require permits or
licenses prior to construction of a private dam, only 38 require a review of plans and specifications prior to construction, 10° and only 24 cover repairs, alterations, modifications
or reconstruction 21' and but 10 expressly require a permit or
review process to remove a dam. 212 The language of several
new statutes, such as "substantially alter" or "materially
alter" could be construed to cover removal. ' One other
state, Iowa, has an opinion of the state attorney general

210.

Program, supra note 7, at A-134 to A-136.
Only Arizona, California (uncodified), Colorado, Maryland, Nebraska, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin require special instrumentation in the structures. Arizona, California,
Colorado, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Texas specifically mention piezometers. Id. at
A-137 to A-139.
ALA. CODE tit. 18 § 2-2 (probate court if on non-navigable stream), ALA. CODE tit. 33
§ 7-30 (secretary of state if navigable stream), ARIZ. REV. STATS. §§ 45-702(A),
45-703(A), ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-1304, 1306, CAL. WATER CODE § 6006, CoL. REV.
STAT. §§ 37-87-105, 117 (note Colorado requires the approval of plans and specifica-

tions, but has no permit or licensing requirement), CONN. GEN. ANN. § 25-112, DEL.
CODE tit. 23 § 1904 (superior court if on non-navigable stream), FL. STAT. ANN. §
373.413, IDAHO CODE § 42-1712, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 19 § 70, IND. CODE ANN. §
13-2-1-3(2), IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455A.19-25(2), 469.1, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-1502,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 11, MD. ANN. CODE ART. 8 §§ 802, 803, MASS. ANN.

LAWS ch. 253 § 44, MicH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 281-133, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.42,
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-31, 39, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 236.030 (circuit court for nonnavigable streams), NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-257, NEV. REV. STAT. § 535.010, N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 482.4, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:4-1, N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 75-5-1, N.Y.

WATER LAW tit. § 15-0503(b), N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143.215.26, .27, N.D. CENT. CODE §
61-02-20, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1521.06, OR. REV. STAT. § 537.130, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 32 § 682, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 46-19-3, S.C. CODE § 49-11-200, S.D. CoMp. LAWS
ANN. § 46-5-11, TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-2505, TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, §

11.121. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-5-5, VER. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1082, VA. CODE § 62.1-85,
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.350. W. VA. CODE § 20-50-5, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 31.05,
WYO. STAT. § 41-3-302.

211.

ALA. CODE tit. 18

§

2-17 (probate court), ARiz. REV. STATS. § 45-702, CAL. WATER

CODE § 6006, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-112, DEL. CODE tit. 22 § 1909 (nonnavigable stream), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.413, IDAHO CODE § 42-1712, IOWA CODE

ANN. § 455A.18, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-1502, MD. ANN. CODE Art. 8 § 803, MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 253 § 44, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 281.132(4), MINN. STAT. ANN. §

105.42, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482.3, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:4-1, N.C. GEN. STAT. §
143.215.27, N.Y. WATER LAW tit. 5. § 15-0503(b), OR. REV, § 537.130, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 32 § 682, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 46-19-3, S.C. CODE § 49-11-210, TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 70-2502(e), 2505, TEX. REV. CIR. STAT. ANN. tit. 2 § 11.144, UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 73-5-5, VER. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1082, 1083, VA. CODE §§ 62.18-83, 116, WASH.
REV. CODE 1 90.03.350, WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 31.04, 31.13, WEST VA. CODE § 20-5-5,
WYo. STAT.§ 4-3-301, Florida requires an operation and maintenance permit. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 373.416. Illinois and Indiana require the owner to keep existing dams
maintained and repaired. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 19 § 70, IND. CODE ANN. § 13-2-20-2.
Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio and Oklahoma did not require permits. Dam Safety Program,
supra note 7, at A-71 to A-75.
212.

ARiz. REV. STAT. § 45-706, CAL. WATER CODE § 6077, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §

25-112, IDAHO CODE § 42-1715 (Idaho requires an inspection during removal), IOWA
CODE ANN. § 109-15, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105-42, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:4-9 (if in existence 20 years or more, and permanent improvements by owner of the land), N.C.

213.

GEN. STAT. § 143-215-26, S.C. CODE § 49-11-200, TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-2505, W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-50-5, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 31-185.
See e.g. MD. ANN. CODE art. 8, § 803 (repair, alter or any change), MASS, ANN. LAWS
ch. 253 § 441, NEV. REV. STAT. § 535.010 (reconstruct or alter in any way), and R.I..
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 46-19-3 (substantially alter).
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which construes its statute as requiring a permit to remove a
21 4

dam.

Only seven states employ a bifurcated permit system
whereby separate authorization is necessary for the construction and operation stages. Arizona and Idaho require
the filing of plans and drawings upon completion of construction.2 16 These plans should include a record of all grout

holes and grouting, permanent location points and bench
marks, record of tests of concrete or other materials used in
constructing the dam, and
other items bearing on safety and
16
permanence of location.1

Nineteen states expressly authorize the agency to impose terms and conditions in a permit or to modify a plan.'
One may assume, though, that in the remainder of states
where the agency possesses the power to deny a permit, it effectively possesses the power to impose terms or conditions
since it could deny the application until it contained the
desired conditions. An interesting variation on the standard
power to impose terms and conditions in a permit is that
Tennessee can impose different conditions, or types of conditions in approving a dam or reservoir based upon different
hazard categories. 1 8
In issuing a certificate of approval, which is not good for
over five years in Tennessee," 9 the Tennessee statute is quite
explicit, and could serve as a model for other states. The
Commissioner of Conservation is to consider relevant circumstances, including size and type of dam, topography,
geology, soil conditions, hydrology, climate, use of the reser214.
215.

Opinion, Iowa Att. Gen., April 10, 1972.
ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 45-709, 709(c), COLO. REV. STAT. § 37.87.119, CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 25-113, 114, IDAHO CODE §§ 42-1715, 45-709(c), N. MEX. STAT. ANN. §§
75-5-8, 9, 11, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215-30, S. DAR. COMP. LAws. ANN. § 46-5-27.

California, Kentucky, New Jersey, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin also
claim to possess the equivalent of a bifurcated permit system, but these requirements do explicitly not appear in the statutes. I Dam Safety Program, supra
216.
217.

218.
219.

note 7, at A-65 to A-67.
ARiz. REV. STAT. § 45-709, IDAHO CODE § 42-1716.
ARiz. REV. STAT. § 45-707(a, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-114, IDAHO CODE §§
42-1715, 1719, IOWA CODE ANN. § 469.5, KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 82a § 303, MD. ANN.
CODE art. 8 § 807, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.44(2), 105.45, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:402,
N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 75-59, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.28(a), 215.30(c), OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1521.06, OR. REV. STAT. § 537.196, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 §§ 684, 685,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-2513, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-91 (for public safety), 62.1-90
(modify plans), W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-50-4(c).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-2513.

Id at § 70-2514.
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voir and the lands lying in the flood plain downstream and
the hazard category of the dam.120 On-the-site inspections are
prescribed,2 ' and the certificate cannot be issued unless the
Commissioner determines "that the proposed action will be
conducted in such a way that the safety of the public is adequately provided for".22 Conditions can be imposed in the
permit. 22 3 Both Tennessee 224 and West Virginia 225 expressly

include existing dams in the statutes.
5. Inspections and Records
The statutory pattern with respect to dam inspections is
varied.2

26

Twenty-three states provide on-site inspections by

state personnel during construction,22 and thirty-two have
authority to perform safety inspections after construction.2 28
220. Id.
221. Id. at § 70-2511.
222. Id. at § 70-2512(1)
223. Id. at § 70-2513.
224. Id. at § 70-2508.
225. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-50-11, existing dams are to be inspected by the state. Minnesota exempts dams constructed prior to July 1, 1937, except sigificantly, as
necessary to protect the health and safety of the state. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
105.42(3), 105.53. In New Jersey every dam and reservoir is to furnish a description
of the facility and cause to be made surveys, plans and drawings, as may be
necessary to give sufficient information for determining its safety. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 58:43.
226. The following states provide for dam inspections: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-712(a), ARK.
STAT. ANN. §21-1306(2), CAL. WATER CODE § 6102, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-87-106,
109, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-111, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.423(1), IDAHO CODE §
42-1701, IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2-20-7, IOWA CODE ANN. § 469.11, ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 38 § 811, MD. ANN. CODE art. 8 § 809, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 253 § 45, MicH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 281.132, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.52, MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §
89-702(2), NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-208, NEV. REV. STAT. § 535-030, N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 482.6, 482.8, 482.46, 482.59, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:4-4, N. MEX. STAT. ANN. §
75-5-8, N.Y. WATER LAW tit. 5, §§ 15-0507, 15-0511(1), N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
143-215-32, 215-37, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1521.06, OR. REV. STAT.§ 540.350(3), PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 685, tit. 71 § 510-4, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 46-19-4, S.C. CODE §§
49-11-170, 49-11-240, S. DAK. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 46-19-5, TENN. CODE ANN. §§
70-2505(b), (k), TEX. REV. Civ. CODE ANN. ART. 12.016, 12.017, UTAH CODE ANN. §
73.56, VER. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1095, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-50-4(i), WIs. STAT.

227.

228.

ANN. §§ 31.02(3), 31.19, Wyo. STAT. §§ 41-3-347, 41-3-310.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-708(a), ARE. STAT. ANN. § 45-708, CAL. WATER CODE § 6075,
COLO. REV. STAT. 8 37-87-105, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-113, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
373.423(1), IDAHO CODE § 42-1715, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 595 §44, MICH. COUP. LAWS
ANN. § 281-132, MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 89-711, NEV. REV. STAT.§ 535-010(5), N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 482.6, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:4-8, N. MEX. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-5-8 (by
supervising engineers). 75-5-10 (lyctate), N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-20, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1521.06, OR. REV. STAT. §§540.3501(3), 540-380, PA. STA-. ANN. tit. 32
§ 685, S.C. CODE § 49-11-230(a), TEX. REV. CIV. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 12.016, tit. 6.064,
6.065, UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-5-5, VER. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1095, W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-50-9.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 45-709, 712, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1306(a)(2), CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 6100, 6102, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37.87.119, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-111, FLA.

STAT. ANN. § 373.423(3), IDAHO CODE § 42-1717, IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-2-20-4, MD.
ANN. CODE art. 8 § 809, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 253 § 45, MICH. CoUP. LAWS ANN. §
281.132. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.52, MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 89-702(2), 89-704,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-208. NEV. REV. STAT. § 535.030(1)(a), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
4828, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:4-4, 58:4-8, N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 75-58, N.Y. WATER

LAW tit. 5 § 15-0507, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143.215.30, 143.215.32, OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1521.062, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 540.350(3), 540.390, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 685,
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Some statutes are quite broad, authorizing inspection at any

time, before, during or after construction, at dams constructed prior to enactment of the regulatory statute..9 or
authorizing a right of access site through private property
without any liability for trespassing."'3 Some statutes
authorize access at any time whereas others are limited to
reasonable times. 3 '
Oregon
site, plans
damage to
preliminary

requires a pre-construction inspection of the
and specifications if failure would result in
life or property.3 2 South Carolina authorizes
investigations, and then, if the dam poses a

danger, detailed investigations, which are all studies and
analyses necessary to evaluate conclusively the structural
safety of a dam or reservoir, including soil analyses, concrete
or earth stability analyses, materials testing, foundation exploration, and hydrologic analyses, including basin studies
and flood potential. 3 South Carolina's statute is unique in

requiring this thoroughness of investigation.
Only twelve states require periodic investigations of all
dams,' 1 but four of these impose no maximum time span,
but instead authorize a flexible "as often as necessary" approach.2 31 The others prescribe periods ranging from one
year to five. While most inspection statutes expressly or imGEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 46-19-1,5, S.C. CODE §§ 49-11-170, 240, S. DAR. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 46-5-27, 46-19-5. TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-2516, UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-5-6.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 31.19, WYO. STAT. § 41-3-311. VER. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1095, W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-50-41 j.

R.I.

229.
230.

231.
232.
233.
234.

235.

Iowa, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Texas and Washington also assert a right to perform safety inspections after construction. Dam Safety Program, supra note 7, at
A-89 to A-92.
See e.g. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1306(2), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482.59, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71 § 510.4(2).
CAL. WATER CODE § 6081, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-110, IDAHO CODE § 42-1701(5)
(reasonable entry), IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-2-20-7, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215-37, OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1521.07, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 46-49-6, S.C. CODE § 49-11-240,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-2505(r), TEX. REV. CIv. CODE ANN. tit. 2 § 12.017, W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-50-4(i), Wis. STAT. ANN. § 3102(3).
See e.g. NED. REV. STAT. § 46-208.
OR. REV. STAT. § 540.350.
S.C. CODE § 49-11-120(7).
IDAHO CODE § 42-1717 (dams 20' in height every two years, else as often as
necessary), IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-2-20-4 (once a year), MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 253 § 45
(two years), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.32 (5 years), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1521.06
(5 years), WIs. STAT. ANN. § 31.19 (every two years if produces over 750 horsepower
annually), Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-311 (at least once every five years).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-771, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482-8, R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 46-19-1, TENN. CODE ANN. § 78-2516. In addition, Colorado requires an annual determination by the state engineer of the amount of water which can be stored
in a reservoir.
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plicitly cover existing dams, Tennessee goes one step further
and requires all existing dams to apply for a permit."'
In Michigan if hazardous conditions exist in a dam, the
Department of Natural Resources can require the filing of a
report by a registered professional engineer on the condition
of the dam, including statements on whether leakage is present, whether signs of disintegration or erosion of material of
the dam or abutments or foundations are evident, and a
statement on other changes in conditions relating to safety.
The department may then order necessary repair or removal
23 7
of the dam.
A corollary requirement to inspections is that of the
maintenance of records by the dam owner or operator such
that not only is the history of the dam available to the inspectors, but that any suspected safety problem can be
viewed in its total perspective. Only California 3 8 and
Idaho 39 statutorily charge owners with the responsibility of
maintaining records and reports on maintenance, operations,
staffing and engineering and geologic investigations.
The paucity of mandatory inspections for all dams, not
just large dams, illustrates the weaknesses in the existing
dam safety program. Most breaks are in existing dams, not
dams under construction. Yet, statutory provisions in states
which mandate dam safety inspections, rarely cover all dams
which might pose a threat to life or property.
6. Citizen Involvement
The statutes are deficient in safeguarding individual
rights, perhaps reflecting the pre-environmental movement
theory that administrative agencies are the means of maximizing the public welfare and interest, and that citizen action is frequently frivolous. Sixteen states provide for safety
investigations based upon citizen's complaints, 4 but many
236.
237.

238.
239.
240.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-2508. See also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-50-11 and Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 31.07.
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 281.132.
CAL. WATER CODE § 6101.
IDAHO CODE § 42-1717.
ARz. REV. STAT. § 45-713, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-87-109, IDAHO CODE § 42-1709, IND.
STAT. ANN. § 13"2-20-4, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 811, MD. ANN. CODE art. 8 §
809, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 253 § 45, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.52, MONT. REV. CODE
ANN. § 89-702(2), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482,43 (selectmen of town or mayor of
city), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48-4-4, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215-32, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 §
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of these are limited to citizens owning property.141 In addition to these 16 states, an additional eight also provide for
citizen initiated safety investigations, but either expressly
mandate, 42 or in the agency's discretion,2 4 3 require the complainant to advance the costs of the safety inspection. As
previously indicated, the effect of these statutes, which emphasize the rights of the dam owner, may be to discourage a
complaint or investigation in a case where a timely investigation may have prevented a dam break.
Another limiting factor on citizen involvement is that
only 17 states authorize public hearings,244 and most of these
occur in the initial permit authorization process, not in the
investigation of a suspected safety issue of an existing dam.
Eighteen states expressly authorize judicial appeals of an
administrative order,24 5 but here too, some states allow ap-

peal only for the state or dam applicant,2 46 not the broader

"any aggrieved party" test.24 1 On the other hand, many state
administrative procedure acts may authorize broad citizen
participation before agencies and judicial review. '
7. Remedial Powers
The ultimate strength of any dam safety program will
depend upon its crisis-resolution abilities. If timely in685, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
241.

242.
243.
244.

245.

246.
247.
248.

4 46-19-4,

S.C. CODE § 49-11-170, VER. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 §

1095(11, WIs. STAT. ANN. § 31.19.
See e.g. NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-1506.08

(3 title holders), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58-4-4 ("owning or residing"), OR. REV. STAT. § 540.390 ("owning or residing"), R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 49-19-4. In Maine it takes 10 to complain, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 811
and Vermont requires 10 taxpayers. VEa. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1095.
COLO. Rev. STAT. § 37-87-111, N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 75-5-11, UTAH CODE ANN. §
73-5".
ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 45-713, 732, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-111 ($100 deposit),
MASS. LAWS ANN. ch. 253 § 45, OR. REV. STAT. § 540.390, Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-312.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1306(c), IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455A.19(2), 469.3, MD. ANN. CODE
art. 8 § 806, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.31(6), 105.44, NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-209, N.
MEx. STAT. ANN. § 75-54.1, N.Y. WATER LAW tit. 5, 4 15-0503(3)(d, OR. REV. STAT. §
537.170 (for hydroelectric production over 100 horsepower), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 §
685, TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-2523(a), VA. COnE ANN. § 62.1-86, VEa. STAT. ANN. tit. 10
§§ 1085, 1091, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-50-7, WIs. STAT. ANN. § 31.06, WYO. STAT. §
41-3-308a)(ii).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1312 ("any person affected"), CoLO. REv. STAT. § 37-87-112,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-117. IDAHO CODE § 42-1720, IOWA CODE ANN. §
455A-20, 455A-37, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.47, MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 89-702(3),
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-210, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482-10, N.Y. WATER LAW tit. 5 §
15-05.5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-215-33, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 4 1521.061, OR. REV.
STAT. § 537.185, S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-11-260, TENN. CODE ANN. 460-2524, VE. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10 § 1099, WASH. REv. CODE § 86-16-110, Wvo. STAT. § 41-3-318.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1521.061, VER. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 1099.
See e.g. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1312.
In addition, many statutes provide that a violation of the dam safety laws constitute a public nuisance for which anyone can seek judicial redress. See e.g. ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 21-1312, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-311, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.433,
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vestigation and remedial measures prevent a major disaster,
then the program is a success. If not, either the statute or its
implementation must be examined and improved. Unfortunately, critical gaps exist in the crisis-resolving abilities of
the state statutes. Few statutes govern indirectly related
public-safety hazards, such as reservoir-discharge control.
Stream-flow monitoring, dam instrumentation and emergency warning systems are virtually non-existent. Thirty-one
states authorize the agency to order remedial measures by
the owner, 4 ' but only 18 authorize the agency to take
emergency action, 50 such as lowering the water level, emptying or breaching the dam if necessary, or any other measures
necessary. Of these 17 states, one, Tennessee, 5 ' requires the
governor to issue a state of emergency order, and another,
Massachusetts, has no express statutory authority to take
emergency action,
but relies upon an opinion of the state's
2 52
attorney general.

The lack of express statutory authority to take emergency action is not necessarily critical since a dam threatening
to break would undoubtedly be held to constitute a public
nuisance, and states possess sufficient authority to abate
public nuisances. However, if prompt action is necessary to
avert a disaster, we do not want the officials on the line
wasting precious time in ascertaining whether they possess
sufficient authority to act. Consequently, express statutory
authorization is preferred. Surprisingly, considering the
perils apparent with dam breaks, little statutory criteria is
provided for determining a hazardous condition. California
IND. STAT. ANN.

§

455A.39, IOWA CODE ANN. § 469.15, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.

17 §

2797, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 31.25.
249.

250.

251.
252.

CAL. WATER CODE §§ 6081,6110, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-111, FLA. STAT. ANN.

§

373.434, IDAHO CODE § 42-1718, IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-2-20-4, IOWA CODE ANN. §
455A.28(3), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 812, MD. ANN. CODE art. 8 § 809, MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 253 §§ 46, 46, MicH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 281.132(1), MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 105.52, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 489-9, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58-4-5, N. MEX.
STAT. ANN. § 75-5-10, N.Y. WATER LAW tit. 5 § 15-0500(2), N.C. GEN. STAT. §
143.215-32(b), N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-02-20, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1521.052, OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 40-360, 370, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 685 (applies to all dams wherever
constructed), R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 46-19-4, S.C. CODE § 49-11-160, TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 70-2505(e), 2518, UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-5-6, VER. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 §
1095(a), W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-50-8.
ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 45-712(b) and (c), CAL. WATER CODE §§ 6110, 6111, COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-87-109, IDAHO CODE § 42-1717, IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-2-2-5, MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 105.42, MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 89-705, NEV. REV. STAT. § 535-030, N.Y.
WATER CODE tit. 5 § 15-0607(ii), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143.215-32(c), PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
32 § 686, tit. 71 § 510.4(2), S.C. CODE § 49-11-190, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-50-10, Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 31.19, Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-307.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-2520.
MASS. Op. ATT. GEN., Sept. 24, 1975.
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provides that in determining if a dam or reservoir constitutes or would constitute a danger to life or property,
seepage, earth movement or other conditions would be considered." 3 Thirty states also authorize injunctive relief for
statutory violations. 54
8. Miscellaneous Provisions
Another critical safety provision, that of outlet
facilities, receives little attention in the statutes. Only seven
states provide for outlets,2 but some of these are not
designed for safety purposes, but only for the protection of
the water rights of others.25

Five states charge their agencies with investigating,
studying and collecting data on dam safety, construction
and maintenance such that they will be able to better carry
out their responsibilities and stay abreast of changing
253.

254.
255.

§ 45-717, CAL. WATER CODE §§ 6110, 6150, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455A.33, 469-15, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-305, ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. ch. 38 § 812 (if engineer finds it unsafe, and owner doesn't correct), MD.
ANN. CODE art. 8 8 813, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 253 § 50, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.55,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 51-3-39, NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-257(4), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
482-12, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:4-6, N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 75-5-11, N.Y. WATER LAW tit.
5, § 74-1103, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 443.215.36(c), OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1521.06, OK.
STAT. ANN. tit. 82 § 10721h), OR. REV. STAT. § 540.370, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 6881,
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 46-14.5 (upon failure of owner to take necessary remedial action), S.C. CODE § 49-111-260, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 70-2505(k), 2525, 2527, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 73-5-6, VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-97, 62.1-104.1 (rules and regulations by
the State Water Control Board, but basically excluded dams regulated elsewhere),
VER. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1094, WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.350 (equals a public
nuisance), WiS. STAT. ANN.§ 31.021 (equals a public nuisance).
CAL. WATER CODE § 6081. See also, IDAHO CODE § 42-1717 for similar factors, including overtopping, settlement and cracking.
ARIz. REV. STAT. § 45-732 (large enough to accommodate the flood flow of the
stream), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-1502 (can't approve construction of a dam unless it
ARIz. REV. STAT.

§ 25-116,

contains folld gates, or openings that can be opened in times of high water, so as to
prevent the overflow of lands in the vicinity of the dam), MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §
281.132(3) (the director of the Department of Natural Resources may require an
underspill device that will discharge water from the lake bottom), Wis. STAT. ANN. §
31.02(4)(d) (the agency may order spillways or floodgates capable of permitting the
passage of freshlets and floods during all seasons), WYo. STAT. § 41-3-313 (outlet so
that system may be evacuated or maintained at any water level required by the
state engineer), § 41-30-7(b) (dams constructed prior to enactment of the statute
may be breached when public safety requires if they have no outlet or means for

lowering the reservoir water level).

In addition, California (but not formalized or codified), Idaho (1-year flood frequency), Illinois (capable of passing design frequency flood without overtopping),

Nebraska (based on hazard), Nevada (all dams must have emergency spillway), New

256.

Hampshire (100 year stream), New Jersey (100 year flow), Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island (100 year stream), Washington (100 year flood), and Wisconsin (100 year
flow), require outlets and spillways. See Dam Safety Program, supra note 7, at
A-130 to A-133.
For example, the statutes require a conduit sufficient to pass all normal stream flow.
See e.g. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1306(1), COLO. REV. STAT. § 1371-87-119, MD. CODE
ANN. 1813-2-1-3(2), OK. STAT. ANN. tit. 60 § 60, OR. REV. STAT. § 540.330 (if necessary

for protection of other areas, may require an outlet allowing the natural flow of the
stream).
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technology.1 7 Indeed, West Virginia commands its agency
to review the criteria annually." 8 This type of proposal, if
widely implemented, would greatly advance dam safety.
Twenty-four states specifically authorize their agencies
to issue rules and regulations governing dam safety and construction.2 5 9 Tennessee 6 and Indiana"' provide for variations in rules based upon differences in topography, geology,
soil conditions, climate, hydrology and the potential perils to
life and property. In states where these powers have not
been expressly given the agency, the agency might still possess them pursuant to either an administrative procedures
act, or pursuant to the general delegation of powers to the
specific agency.
Another general provision is one which relieves the state
of any liability in its act,262 while many statutes provide that
irrespective of the dam-safety legislation, the owner of a dam
63
remains liable.
Other state provisions, of a idiosyncratic nature, are
designed to promote dam safety. For example, Ohio borrows
from a well-proven method of ensuring viable strip-mine
reclamation,26 ' and requires applicants to post a bond, equal
257.
258.
259.

260.

CAL. WATER CODE § 6120, IOWA CODE ANN. § 469-10, N.C. GEN. STAT. § N3-215.34,
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 70-2505(b), 2505(g). W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-50-4().
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-50-4(j).
ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 45-702(b), 712(a), ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1304, CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 6078, 6101, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-110, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.413, IDAHO
CODE § 42-1714, IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-2-20-3, IOWA CODE ANN. § 455A-17, KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 82a-303, MD. ANN. CODE art. 8 § 733, MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 281.133,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-209, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:5A-3, N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 75-5-1,
N.Y. WATER LAW tit. 5 § 430, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.34, N. DAK. CENT. CODE §
61-02-14, OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 1521.06, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 685, S.C. CODE §
49-11-240(c) (including minimum safety design, standards for impoundments, safety
inspection standards and water discharge or drawdown rate and levels in unsafe impoundments), S. DAK. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 16-5-10, 11, TENN. CODE ANN. §
70-2504(c), TEx. REV. CIR. STAT. ANN. tit. 2 § 12-052(a), VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-100,
104.1 (ensure impoundment structures are properly and safely constructed, maintained and operated), WASH. REV. CODE § 86.16.026, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-50-4(d).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-2504(c).

261.

IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-2-20-3.

262.

ARiZ. REV. STAT. § 45-715(a), CAL. WATER CODE § 6028, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-87-115

(including employees), CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-115, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.443,
IDAHO CODE § 42-1717, IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-2-20-8, NEV. REV. STAT. § 535.040, N.C.

263.

264.

GEN. STAT. § 143-215.35, S.C. CODE § 49-11-250, WASH. REV. CODE § 86.16.100, Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 31.26j4), WYO. STAT. § 41-3-316.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-7151B), CAL. WATER CODE § 6029, COLO. § 37-87-113, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-115, GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1306, IDAHO CODE § 42-1717, MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 253 § 49, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.35, OR. REV. STAT. § 540-350(2),
S.C. CODE § 49-11-250, TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-2528, TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. tit. 2
§ 12.052, W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-50-10, 13, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 31.26(4), Wyo. STAT.
§ 41-3-317.
See Binder, A Novel Approach to Reasonable Population of Strip Mining, 35 U.
PiTr. L. REV. 339, 335 (1973).
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in amount to 50% of the estimated cost of the project, conditioned upon completion of the dam, dikes or levee in accordance with the terms of the permit, and the approved plans
and specifications. Monies collected from a bond forfeiture
go into a "Dam Safety Fund" to complete sites for which
bonds have been forfeited, or otherwise render them non-hazardous. 5 One year after approval of construction, and no
fact has appeared to indicate that the construction was not
performed in the approved manner, and that as constructed,
it will not endanger life, health or property, the bond shall be
released. 66 Thus, a waiting period is established, hopefully
sufficient in length, to appraise the safety of the dam as constructed.
New York may also require the posting of a bond by the
permittee, conditioned upon compliance with the terms of
the permit.2 67 As to the problem of maintaining a dam in safe
condition, New York places an affirmative duty on the
licensee of water power works to keep them in good repair
and in efficient working order. 68 Wisconsin will not issue a
permit unless the applicant furnishes proof of ability to
operate and maintain the dam in good condition, for a
reasonable period of time, but not less than 10 years.2 69 The
problem with this provision is that the physical life of a dam
may exceed its economic life, and a "reasonable period of
time" might not be construed to mean the physical life of the
structure.
On the other hand, South Carolina requires the dam
owner to be solely responsible for maintaining the dam or
reservoir in a safe condition throughout the life of the structure.270 Indiana requires the owner to maintain it using
prudence and sound and accepted engineering principles. 7 '
Florida2 72 and Minnesota 273 both have statutory presumptions of non-use so that the state can take over an
265.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1521.061.

266.

1& at § 1521.06.

267.

N.Y. WATER LAW tit. 5 § 15-0509.

268.

ldc at tit. 17 § 15-1727(i).

269.

WiS. STAT. ANN. § 31.14.

270.

S.C. CODE § 44-11-150. Arkansas requires construction and maintenance for the permit 271 Life of the Structure. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21-1306(1).

271.
272.

IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-2-20-2.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.426 (three years).

273.

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 110.37 (fifteen years). The Minnesota statute applies the
presumption to the dam site and appul-tenant flowage easements as well as to the
dam itself. Id.
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"abandoned" dam so as to afford a means of allowing the
state to alleviate a potential problem. 74 Texas authorizes its
become a public
agency to condemn existing works if they
27 5
menace or dangerous to life or property.
New Hampshire authorizes the New Hampshire Water
Resources Board to acquire dams in disrepair and reconstruct and maintain them; 27a it can appoint an advisory
board to help. 77 If the owner of a dam in disrepair fails to
take corrective measures,278 then the town can acquire the
dam through eminent domain, 79 as in Texas. 280 If the owner
is under a legal disability or his residence is unknown, a guardian ad litem can be appointed to represent his interests.28 '
This measure could serve as a model for other states with old
and abandoned dams, which create a potential hazard to life
or property.
Finally, Montana has an interesting provision which,
unfortunately, is not self-executing:
No person must fill, or procure to be filled with
water, any reservoir which is not so thoroughly and
substantially constructed as to safely hold water
that might be turned therein. 82
Nor can he construct a dam except in a thorough, secure and
substantial manner. 283
The result of this exhaustive excursion through the
state statutes is to show just how deficient the existing state
274.

275.

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Of course, this type of provision may impose a huge cost obligation on the state to
render the dam and reservoir safe, or to remove it. The cost implications have not, as
yet, been faced. The Minnesota statute provides that when the cost of repair or
reconstruction is less than $50,000, the agency can order the necessary work. Up to
$100,000 requires the consent of the state executive council. Once $100,000 is required, then the agency must proceed to the legislature. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
105.482(5).
TEX. REV. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 6.063, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482:36. A dam in
disrepair is defined as one which is a menace to public safety, or incapable of safely
impounding flood waters to its crest, or incapable of maintaining a reasonably constant level of waters impounded, or one which does not contain adequate gates and
sluiceways to provide for the holding or controlled discharge of water impounded.
Id. at § 482.1ii).
Id. at § 482:37.
Id at § 482:46. The owner of a dam is now statutorily charged with the duty of not
allowing it to become a dam in-disrepair. Id. at § 482:42.
Id. at § 482:47.
TEX. REV. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2 § 12.015.
VER. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1095(b).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482.55.
MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 89-701. Indiana also requires the owner of a dam to keep it
in repair. IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-2-20-2.
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 89-702.
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regulatory system is. In pointing out individual state provisions that differ from the general pattern, it should be realized that there are relatively few exceptions to the general
pattern which, in itself, is deficient.
Several figures illustrate these inadequacies. Only
eleven statutes cover any dam which may pose a threat to
human life or property. Only sixteen states authorize the use
of outside experts. Only a few states require detailed
baseline studies. Only 24 states require permits for repairs,
alterations, modifications or reconstruction and only ten
provide for removal of a dam.
Perhaps the best way of illustrating the statutory
vagaries is that Tennessee, with an excellent statute, has
had a sporadic enforcement record, whereas California, with
but a relatively standard statute, has made the most of it.
California's regulations were spurred by a major dam break
in 1928, which killed 450, thereby spurring a rigorous safety
effort, and serving as the progenitor of dam safety measures.
It is encouraging that South Carolina, Tennessee, West
Virginia and Wyoming have recently enacted comprehensive
dam safety measures, illustrating that states are increasingly perceiving the need for meaningful dam safety regulation.
VI. CONCLUSION

It is clear that minimum dam safety and inspection
criteria must be enforced by the states if dam safety is to be
advanced. It is equally clear, as seen in the preceding section, that the existing state regulatory pattern is grossly inadequate. The existing state statutes are inconsistent, and
at variance with each other. Few of them provide adequate
dam safety and inspection programs. Third, dams, reservoirs and raging rivers are not respectful of a state's borders. Consequently, an excellent dam safety program in one
state may not protect its citizens against a dam break
upriver in another state, where dam safety programs are inadequate.
Consequently, as in the areas of air and water pollution,
surface mining, solid waste disposal, and other areas, a need
exists for uniform minimal national dam safety and inspechttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss2/1
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tion criteria. An independent federal agency should be
established to carry out this purpose. The approach should
be the now familiar cooperative effort between the federal
and state governments. Federal funds would be provided the
states, which would possess primary line authority to implement the act, contingent upon meeting the minimum national standards. Failure of a state to implement the requisite plan would result in promulgation of a federal plan
for the state.
As for federal dams, the existing agencies should be
allowed to construct their own dams, conditioned again upon
meeting the national standards and the use of outside review
boards. Society would thereby have the benefit of their expertise and diversity of approaches.
The overall federal program should be run by an independent federal agency, which would possess the duty and
power to inspect federal dams.284 In this way, federal dams
would be investigated by an independent agency, and drawing upon the results learned from these investigations and
state reports, be in a position to adopt new safety and inspection criteria.
Realistically, this proposal is not politically possible at
the present time. Major opposition by the states could be expected. Water rights have traditionally been a hallowed area
of state rights under Western water law; some states currently maintain the present federal inspections program infringe their rights.185 A major reason for the 5-year hiatus in
actual inspections was a belief by the Nixon and Ford administrations that dam inspections should be a matter of
state responsibility. In this respect, the proposal places
primary emphasis upon the states.
In conclusion though, let us reiterate that the history of
dam safety legislation has been a crisis-reaction svndrnmp. 286
284.
285.

286.

This recommendation also appears in a Congressional report. Teton Dam Failure,
supra note 18, to 81.
For example, C. Stephan Allred, Director of the Idaho Department of Water
Resources, testified to Congress that they did not want federal inspections or standards. He testified "we do not need nor will we accept federal requirements that we
adopt a common approach or that we observe nationwide standards," and suggested the current Corps inspections stepped on states' rights. Denver Post, Feb. 5,
1978 at p. 45, col. 1.
One final example should suffice. North Carolina passed its dam safety act in 1967.
It was not until 1977 that the first money was appropriated or an administrator ap-
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Now is the time to adopt a preventative program before
many more dams break.

pointed to carry out its provisions. A staff of two was then established to operate
the purposes. 300 dams were inspected between 1974 and 1976. In February 1976
Bear Wallow Dam collapsed, killing four. A crash program of dam inspections was
then undertaken. 22 individuals were hired, 3,082 dams were inspected. 100 dams
have subsequently undergone more extensive examination, extensive repair, or
removal. Dam Safety, supra note 4, at 18-19.
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